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The challenge of ensuring grid security becomes more complex with the 
advancement of new technology and major events causing widespread damage 
in the system. Threats of cyber-attacks create permutations of possible 
contingencies that may have never been considered in typical operations and 
planning. Natural disasters have caused devastating effects, taking out entire 
power systems and leaving thousands of customers without service for extended 
periods. The integration of more renewables into the grid creates dynamic 
stability concerns due to the replacement of large, rotating machines. In these 
examples, security can be assessed by studying dynamic stability, while also 
considering the consequences of each contingency or modification in the system. 
 
Security has been analyzed in three separate projects using various systems. 
The first project is Multi-Timescale Integrated Dynamics and Scheduling for Solar 
(MIDAS). In this project, a machine learning tool was used to determine security 
criteria for frequency, transient, and small-signal stability of a power system 
integrated with renewables. Security assessment is a fundamental function for 
both short-term and long-term power system operation. The developed data-
driven security assessment (DSA) criteria uses machine learning to determine 
when it is necessary to trigger dynamic simulation by linking traditional isolated 
dynamic simulation with long-term scheduling. In the second project, a model of 
Puerto Rico’s 2018 transmission system was created. Simulations of major 
contingencies were performed on the Puerto Rico system, including the trip of 
main transmission corridors along the path of destructive Hurricane Maria. In the 
future, higher renewable penetration in the Puerto Rico system is expected. 
Therefore, studies were run at high solar penetration levels to assess dynamic 
stability under these conditions. Lastly, a cybersecurity study of a large system 
was also performed. Several scenarios were analyzed to determine stability 
boundaries and effects of possible targeted attacks. The goal was to determine 
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INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL INFORMATION 
A task force set up jointly between International Council on Large Electric Systems 
(CIGRE) and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) defines power 
system security as the degree of risk in the system’s ability to survive imminent 
disturbances without interruption of customer service, which depends on the 
system operating condition as well as the contingent probability of disturbances 
[1]. This task force defines stability of a power system as the continuance of intact 
operation following a disturbance [1]. Security is distinguished from stability in 
terms of contingency effects, in that two systems can have identical stability 
margins but vary in security due to instability consequences [1]. In order for a 
system to be reliable, it must be secure most of the time. The pyramid in Figure 
1.1 illustrates how a system must be stable to be secure and secure to be reliable. 
 
Stability analysis is an essential part of dynamic security assessment. Along with 
determining whether or not a system will be stable after a given disturbance, the 
probability and consequences of instability should be considered, which 
incorporates security assessment. This thesis covers research performed on three 
projects that involve dynamic security assessments through stability analysis using 
various approaches. 
 
Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA) for Multi-Timescale 
Integrated Dynamics and Scheduling for Solar (MIDAS) 
Multi-Timescale Integrated Dynamics and Scheduling for Solar (MIDAS) is part of 
the Department of Energy (DOE) Solar Energy Technologies Office (SETO) 
program, which focuses on addressing the affordability, flexibility, and 
performance of solar technologies on the grid. Members of the MIDAS team are 
from NREL (National Renewable Energy Laboratory), Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI), Southern Methodist University (SMU), California Independent 
Service Organization (CAISO), Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), 
and the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK).  
 
The goal of MIDAS is to simulate the interaction between market scheduling and 
dynamic responses. This is done by developing temporally comprehensive, 
closed-loop simulation models that seamlessly simulate solar photovoltaic (PV) 
variability and its impact on power systems operations from economic scheduling 
timescales (day-ahead to hours) to dynamic response analysis (seconds to sub-
seconds). A quasi-dynamic method integrates short-term dynamics, mid-term 
scheduling, and long-term unit commitment into a single simulation framework to 






Figure 1.1. Pyramid showing relationship of definitions between stability, security, and reliability 




To assist the quasi-dynamic simulation framework, data-driven security 
assessment (DSA) criteria was used to significantly reduce the computational 
burden. The DSA criteria provides a key indicator to switch the simulation 
method by determining when it is necessary to trigger dynamic simulation. The 
DSA uses machine learning to decide when and to what extent to activate the 
dynamic model during simulation, using dispatch scheduling data as input. The 
stability margins associated with the dynamic security assessment include small-
signal stability, frequency stability, and transient stability. As part of the DSA 
team, UTK was tasked with determining the data-driven-based security 
assessment criteria using model integration. 
 
The concept of this framework presented in Figure 1.2. As presented in this 
diagram, a trigger, or the data-driven-based security assessment, integrates 
power scheduling data with power system dynamics. When incorporating solar 
into the system generation, PV and inverter models become a part of power 




Assessing Security During Natural Disasters and Increased 
Renewable Penetration in Puerto Rico 
In fall 2017, Hurricane Maria became the largest blackout in U.S. history, by 
customer-hours of lost electricity service [3]. Electricity was cut off to 100% of the 
island, with many households going at least 84 days without power [4]. A year 
after the storm, all customers were finally restored. Hurricane Maria also caused 
as much as $94.4 billion in damages and a death toll of almost 3,000 people [4]. 
 
The path of Hurricane Maria, along with main transmission and generation assets 
of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) system, is presented in 
Figure 1.3. According to 2019 census data, about 40% Puerto Rico’s population 
lives in the metropolitan area of San Juan in the northeast corner of the territory 
[5]. The transmission lines carrying electricity from south to north, shown in 
Figure 1.3, are vulnerable since the majority of generation capacity is in the 
south. Although 847 transmission structures fell during the hurricane, the 
complete outage was a result of two main 230kV lines failing after a fire at a 
circuit breaker at the Aguirre plant [5]. Several plants and distribution lines were 
also destroyed due to flooding and strong winds. 
 
After the hurricane, DOE wanted to further analyze Puerto Rico’s grid. DOE’s 
Office of Electricity asked the national laboratories to perform near-term modeling 
activities for Puerto Rico. The request was part of the federal effort to support the 
rebuilding of a more resilient and secure electric power grid system after 














Recommendations to DOE included protection and prevention against future 
natural disasters and weather-related events, along with understanding the 
effects of increased renewable penetration throughout the system. 
Recommendations were developed by creating and analyzing transmission 
system models of the PREPA grid. Additionally, sensors were requested to be 
placed throughout the Puerto Rico system to provide enhanced situational 
awareness and refine developed transmission models by comparing actual 
measurements to modeled power flow and dynamic response. 
 
Assessing Security During Cyber-Attacks and Wide-Area 
Physical Attacks on Bulk Electric System Assets 
The motivation for the cyber-security project was to simulate and evaluate 
dynamic effects of a strategic wide-area cyber-attack, electromagnetic pulse 
(EMP), or geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) in the U.S power grid and other large 
systems. To do this, load flow and dynamic simulations were conducted to 
investigate impacts of hackers shutting down multiple substations or generation 
facilities within an electric utility.  
 
Critical substations, connecting large generation plants and loads to the system, 
were determined as origins of the attacks. For the initial security assessment, 
dynamic frequency stability and voltage stability were analyzed following a major 
attack. Though the probability of the studied scenarios occurring is small, their 
effects were devastating, taking out an entire large system. The purpose of this 
project was to submit cyber-attack simulation results for a proposal to DOE. This 








DYNAMIC SECURITY ASSESSMENT (DSA) FOR MULTI-
TIMESCALE INTEGRATED DYNAMICS AND SCHEDULING 
FOR SOLAR (MIDAS) 
 
This chapter discusses the creation of cases to train and test a UTK-developed 
machine learning tool. Dynamic stability margin was determined using results of 
generated test cases, and the machine learning tool was trained to recognize 
dynamic frequency, transient, and small-signal instability using power flow data 
as input. 
 
Literature Review  
The determination of the security assessment margin can be performed using 
model-based methods (e.g. full simulations) or data-driven methods. Full 
simulations rely on dynamic models and simulations to assess stability. In 
contrast, data-driven methods use datasets to train machine learning models to 
classify stable and unstable cases. The following review of existing methods for 
data-driven security assessment was part of a collaborative literature review with 
Dr. Shutang You and Dr. Yi Cui on the UTK team: 
 
Existing methods for data-driven security assessment primarily focus on transient 
stability. Transient stability is concerned with the ability of the power system to 
maintain synchronism when subjected to a severe disturbance, such as a short 
circuit on a transmission line [1]. The existing literature that applies machine 
learning to determine transient stability mainly uses three categories of methods: 
support vector machine (SVM), neural network (NN), and decision tree (DT). 
Most of these studies used the New England 10-machine system as the test 
system. These methods have reached high accuracy in classifying stable and 
unstable cases. 
 
Table 2.1 to Table 2.4 summarize the machine learning model, along with the 
power system model used in previous studies. The number of total samples, or 
waveforms, analyzed by the model are listed. A portion of these samples were 
used for training and the others for testing. The number of features refers to the 
number of parameters serving as input to the machine learning tool, such as 
individual voltage, angle, or frequency measurements. The percent accuracy 
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Table 2.3. Decision tree (DT) based methods for transient stability assessment 













































Table 2.4. Other methods for transient stability assessment 













































Existing machine-learning methods for data-driven security assessment primarily 
focus on transient stability. Very few studies have investigated frequency and 
small-signal stability assessment using machine-learning approaches. The 
studies found for frequency and small-signal stability are included in Table 2.5 
and Table 2.6. 
 
According to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and 
International Council on Large Electric Systems (CIGRE) definition, frequency 
stability refers to the ability of a power system to maintain steady frequency 
following a severe system upset resulting in a significant imbalance between 
generation and load [1]. Instability that may result occurs in the form of sustained 
frequency swings leading to tripping of generating units and/or loads [1]. Very 
few studies have investigated frequency stability assessment using a data–driven 
approach. In [29], an artificial neural network (ANN) was used to predict the 
frequency stability using power flow information. However, this study does not 
consider the headroom reserve of each generator, which can increase the error 
of the model. 
 
Small-disturbance (or small-signal) rotor angle stability is concerned with the 
ability of the power system to maintain synchronism under small disturbances. 
The disturbances are considered to be sufficiently small. Linearization of a 
system of equations is permissible for the purpose of analysis [1]. Reference [34] 
studied the small-signal stability of a single machine infinite bus system under 
different power and power factor conditions, as well as power system stabilizer 
settings. Reference [35] used a decision tree to predict the eigenvalue region of 
critical modes.  
 
Comparing the accuracy of common machine learning methods, neural network 
models tend to have the highest accuracy, followed by decision tree models and 
support vector machine models, as shown in Figure 2.1. Although not used as 
frequently, the random forest method also has high accuracy. Therefore, the 
neural network and random forest models were selected for the machine-learning 
tool. Only the random forest model has been implemented in the tool, but the 
neural network model will later be integrated as well. 
 
Though previous studies have used machine learning to predict stability, there 
are a few characteristics that make this model novel. Previous studies used 
specific power flow solution parameters as input to a machine learning tool, such 
as voltage and angle at particular buses, power flow of individual branches, along 
with individual machine and load data. Since the developed quasi-dynamic model 
is supposed to integrate long-term scheduling with short-term dynamics, only 
scheduling data, or generator dispatch, is used as an input into the tool. 
Additionally, other previously developed tools do not use models with high PV 






























Table 2.6. Data-driven small-signal stability assessment 

































The machine learning tool created in the DSA project is designed to accurately 
assess the dynamic stability margin in cases with large amounts of solar 
generation. Lastly, each of the past studies mentioned only analyze a single 
stability issue, most often transient stability. This tool analyzes three stability 
issues: frequency, transient, and small-signal. 
 
 
Machine-Learning Based Stability Analysis to Determine 
DSA Criteria  
A machine learning tool, created by Dr. Yi Cui in MATLAB, was used to 
determine DSA criteria. The machine learning steps include database or data file 
extraction, training, classification, and testing. First, the tool extracts feature data 
from a database of real-time data points, directly from PSS®E dynamic 
simulation output files (.out) files, or from other power system simulation software 
files. Before the tool can classify whether or not a case is stable, it is trained by 
sets of stable and unstable cases. The tool then learns what criteria must be set 
based upon feature values from these cases. 
 
Stability of a system was determined by assessing frequency stability, transient 
stability, and small-signal stability. For each stability problem, neural network 
based methods were to be used to develop the data-driven approach for security 
assessment. To train and test the machine learning tool, a number of steady-
state cases were produced in PSS®E, each with varying generation dispatch. 
After steady-state cases were created, dynamic simulations were performed on 
each steady-state case and corresponding dynamic file, with the contingency and 
monitored parameters dependent upon the stability problem assessed. From 
dynamic simulation results, criteria for the security assessment was derived. 
Criteria was verified by inputting only generation dispatch results into the 
machine learning tool. The tool then determined whether or not the stability 
margin was met. These results were confirmed using other cases of simulated 
results. The data-driven assessment approaches developed for each stability 
type are summarized in Table 2.7. 
 
2.1.1 Creation of Steady-State Cases: The 23-Bus System Example 
The first set of steady-state cases were generated using a 23-bus system. The 
23-bus system was provided as an example case with the installation of PSS®E 
33. A diagram of the system is shown in Figure 2.2 was generated from the 
savnw.sld file provided by PSS®E. There are three main areas of the system, 
with Area 1 in the middle and Areas 2 and 5 on each side of Area 1. The total 





Table 2.7. Overview of security assessment approaches for frequency, transient, and small-signal 
stability 
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Each area of the system was assigned a different load curve, based on 
geographic diversity, as indicated in Figure 4.3. Load data was taken from three 
balancing authorities in the Western Interconnection, each at varying longitudes: 
Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO), PacifiCorp West (PACW), and Tucson 
Electric Power Authority (TEPC). Load data was predicted every hour over a 
period of 13 months, from 1/1/2020 0:00 to 1/31/2021 0:00. The 23-bus system 
load was adjusted by taking the total load of each area and scaling it by the 
percent deviation of the corresponding balancing authority’s load data at each 
time. Comparisons of the 23-bus system areas’ total loads and the balancing 
authorities’ total loads over time are shown in Figure 2.4 to Figure 2.9. 
 
An automated scheduling process was used to assign machine maintenance. 
Generator maintenance was scheduled during low-load periods. This process 
considered the system total load curve, machines currently offline or previously 
scheduled to be offline, along with each machine’s capacity. Machine outages 
were scheduled in order from largest to smallest capacity. After each machine’s 
maintenance was scheduled, an equivalent total system load curve was updated 
so the algorithm could account for previously scheduled service periods. Once a 
machine was taken out-of-service, the machine had an out-of-service duration of 
four weeks. 
 
Transmission lines were also taken out of service depending on the probability of 
an outage occurring. Line outage probability was determined using the system’s 
Reliability Outage Statistics Data file (.prb) in PSS®E. This file contains 
information, such as the branch reactance per mile, branch charging 
susceptance per mile, outage frequency for terminal caused single circuit 
outages, outage duration for terminal caused single circuit outages, outage 
frequency for single circuit outages per mile, and outage duration for single circuit 
outages. To calculate frequency and duration of each branch’s outage over 13-
month period, the following computations in (1) were implemented. 
 
xm = branch reactance per mile             (1) 
bm = branch charging susceptance per mile 
ft =  outage frequency for terminal caused single circuit outages 
dt = outage duration for terminal caused single circuit outages 
fmt = outage frequency for single circuit outages per mile 
dmt = outage duration for single circuit outages 
 
 
len = branch x/xm (miles) 
F = len*fmt+ft 
D = (fmt*dmt*len+ft*dt)/F 
Failure Time = F*D/9528 










































The results of a random number generator, with uniform distribution, determined 
whether or not a transmission line was out of service or not at each hour. 
Because transmission line outages were scheduled based on chance, the 
probability of a transmission line being out at a given hour was not dependent 
upon if the line had been previously scheduled to be out-of-service. Examples of 
events causing these types of outages include inclement weather, operator error, 
or other physical disturbances. An outage duration of 10 hours was set for each 
line out-of-service. The Python script used to generate saved cases for the 23-
bus system is included in the Appendix in Section A.1.1. 
2.1.2  Creation of Steady-State Cases: The 18-Bus System 
The 18-bus system was provided by NREL and was originally converted from 
PSLF software to PSS®E. Similar to the 23-bus system, the 18-bus system has 
three areas. It was determined to use the 18-bus system instead of the 23-bus 
system because there is loop flow between four areas, where each area is 
directly connected to at least two other areas. In the 23-bus system, only Area 1 
is connected to each of the other two areas. A diagram of the 18-bus system can 
be found in Figure 2.10. In the 18-bus system, there are 6 machines, with a 
system total capacity of 4,270 MW, 18 branches, 7 transformers, and 8 loads 
totaling 2,130 MW in the base case. 
 
NREL provided load and generation data for the 18-bus system over a 24-hour 
period. Although individual load and machine data was given for every 4 seconds 
of the 24-hour period, saved cases were only generated for every 5 minutes. 
Therefore, 288 PSS®E saved cases were created. The developed saved cases 
were used in frequency, transient, and small-signal analysis. A Python script 
extracted generation and load data from input comma-separated values (CSV) 
files, scaled each machine’s and load’s real power, and saved the results in 
individual PSS®E saved case files for each 5-minute period. The Python script 
used to generate saved cases for the 18-bus system is included in the Appendix 
in Section A.1.2.1. 
 
2.1.3 Data-Driven Frequency Stability Margin Prediction 
To predict the frequency stability margin, the same contingency, a generation 
trip, was run on each file in the batch of generated steady-state cases. Since the 
steady-state cases had various levels of generation dispatch, inertia levels were 
modified in the PSS®E dynamic files accordingly, depending on total generation 
output. The contingency was selected by tripping the maximum amount of 
generation the system could handle, while still converging. After each dynamic 









A curve of the 18-bus system's total generation is shown in Figure 2.11. The 
inertia level was forced to be a percentage of the base inertia depending on total 
generation output. The purpose of adjusting the inertia at each generation level 
was to create a sufficient number of stable and unstable cases to train and test 
the machine learning tool. Though the total generation output over the 24-hour 
period did not change enough to alter unit commitment and dispatch by large 
amounts, the inertia was forced to change linearly, even with a smaller range of 
generation output variation. A linear function was created to correlate generator 
output and inertia level. The percentages ranged from 20% to 100% of the base 
inertia, corresponding to the minimum and maximum total generation output. 
Another Python script was written to extract total generation at each time period 
from a file, scale each machine’s inertia parameter based on the total generation 
value, and save the results to individual PSS®E dynamic files. A curve of the 
total inertia level at each time step, given as a percentage of the base case 
inertia, is shown in Figure 2.12. The Python script used to create the set of 
dynamic files is in the Appendix in Section A.1.2.2. 
 
PSS®E simulations were run on each set of saved cases and dynamic cases. 
While tripping 70 MW of generation on each case, the speed deviations of all 
machines were monitored. To trip exactly 70 MW, machine West G1 was split 
into two machines, with one machine having a constant output of 70 MW and the 
other machine’s output adjusting according to changes in dispatch. Using 
MATLAB, the speed deviations were converted to frequency, and the minimum 
frequency nadirs of all machines for each case were computed and graphed. As 
expected, the frequency nadir follows the pattern of both the inertia and 
generation curves, indicated by Figure 2.13. The Python script used to simulate 
the generation trip on each set of saved cases and dynamic cases is in the 
Appendix in Section A.1.2.3. 
 
For machine learning model development, or training and testing the model, 
stability was determined by examining the frequency nadir of each simulation 
output. Real power dispatch of all generators was provided as input to the 
machine learning tool. The frequency nadir of each generator was estimated, 
subjected to the generation trip. Among 288 generated cases, 70% of cases 
were randomly selected for training, and the remaining cases were used for 
testing.  
 
The capability of the machine learning model in predicting the frequency stability 
margin was then validated by using the power flow solution. During testing, the 
input to the machine learning tool was the real power output of all machines. The 
output was frequency stability margin prediction, based on estimated frequency 
nadir. The distribution of frequency nadir estimation errors was plotted for each 
generator. As seen in Figure 2.14, the estimation error of frequency nadir of 




















































































































































































































































































































































































Minimum Frequency Nadir of All Machines 




2.1.4 Data-Driven Transient Stability Margin Prediction 
To predict the transient stability margin, a three-phase fault on transmission line, 
was introduced in the system. Although the location of the fault was fixed during 
all simulations, fault clearing time was varied. In this example, the fault was on 
the branch between North-01 (Bus 1) and North-02 (Bus 2) in the 18-bus system. 
The same set of fault clearing times were tested at each time step, or every 5 
minutes of the 24-hour data period. At each 5-minute time step, fault clearing 
time was adjusted from 60 ms-720 ms in intervals of 20 ms. Therefore, 9,792 
total test cases were created. Critical clearing time (CCT) was selected as the 
metric of transient stability. CCT is defined as the maximum time allowed to 
remove the disturbance without interrupting the system's performance. The 
system will be stable if the disturbance can be cleared before the time allowed. 
The purpose of adjusting the fault clearing time in small intervals was to create a 
sufficient number of stable and unstable cases to determine a more exact critical 
clearing time. During each simulation, rotor angles of all machines were 
monitored. If the rotor angle deviation of any two generators exceeded 180 
degrees, the case was considered unstable. The Python script used to simulate 
the three-phase fault on the set of saved cases for different clearing times is in 
the Appendix in Section A.1.2.4. 
 
The critical clearing time at each dispatch level, or five minutes of data, was 
determined by finding the maximum clearing time where the system still 
converged at each time step. In general, total system generation and fault critical 
clearing time had an inverse relationship. The system was considered more 
stable during time steps when the fault required a higher critical clearing time and 
less stable when it had a lower critical clearing time. Therefore, greater transient 
stability was observed at lower system generation levels. A graph is provided in 
Figure 2.15 that shows the relationship of total system generation over time to 
critical clearing time of a three-phase fault at a given location. 
 
The capability of the machine learning model in predicting the transient stability 
margin was then validated by using the power flow solution. The input to the 
machine learning tool was individual real power output of all generators. During 
testing, the output was transient stability margin prediction by computing 
estimated fault clearing time as a function of dispatch. Similar to frequency 
stability assessment, 200 power flow cases were randomly selected for training 
and 88 for testing. Figure 2.16 compares the simulated critical clearing time and 
estimated critical clearing time from test results of the machine learning tool. As 






















2.1.5 Data-Driven Small-Signal Stability Margin Prediction 
Cases for training and testing the tool for small-signal stability margin prediction 
were created using a software called Small-Signal Analysis Tool (SSAT). SSAT 
is a part of the DSATools software package, which also includes software for 
power flow and short circuit, transient, and voltage security. SSAT has several 
small-signal computation methods including eigenvalue analysis, computation of 
modes, small-signal stability index, small-signal stability limit search, time and 
frequency response calculations, and others. 
 
SSAT can accept system power flow and dynamic information in PTI PSS®E 
format, GE PSLF format, and BPA format. Because power flow files had already 
been generated in PSS®E, these files were input into SSAT to create a case for 
each dispatch level. Each SSAT case accepts a single PSS®E power flow file in 
RAW format, along with a single dynamic (.dyr) file. Because 288 power flow files 
were generated, every five minutes over a 24-hour period, 288 SSAT cases were 
also created. The same dynamic file was used as input for all 288 SSAT cases. 
Because SSAT does not have an application programming interface (API) to 
easily create a batch of dynamic cases, a MATLAB script was used to change 
the filename of the PSS®E RAW file to be input, since SSAT cases can also be 
read with a text editor.  
 
After SSAT cases were created for each dispatch level, a small-signal stability 
computation was run on each case. The selected computation was full 
eigenvalue analysis. Eigenvalues were derived from the state matrix, which 
determines the time domain response of the system to small perturbations [37]. 
Damping ratio was used to decide which of the eigenvalues had the greatest 






 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑠 𝜁𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑗𝜔𝑖  
 
 
All modes, with corresponding frequencies and damping ratios, were outputted 
for each SSAT case. SSAT has a tool called Case Scheduler to run batch 
simulations. A list of SSAT cases were loaded into the Case Scheduler and run 
at once. After full eigenvalue analysis was computed, 47 oscillation modes were 
found in the 18-bus system at each generation level. Three of the modes had low 
damping ratio (below 10%), and other modes had high damping ratio (above 
18%). Results from the modes with the smallest three damping ratios were 
incorporated into the machine learning tool. Participation factor is defined as the 
relative contribution of each state variable to a particular mode [37]. The 
participation factor of each generator in the system is presented for each of the 
modes. Factors range from 0.0-1.0, where 1.0 means the generator is fully 




comparison of the modeled vs. estimated results from the machine learning tool 
is shown, along with the estimation error. To train and test the model, a specific 
mode was selected at a time. For training, the damping ratio and generator 
dispatch at each 5-minute interval were provided as input to the model, with 200 
of the 288 cases randomly selected to train. The rest of the cases were used to 
test the accuracy of the model, with only generator dispatch as input and 
damping ratio as output. Stability criteria was determined as a negative damping 
ratio being unstable and a positive damping ratio being stable. 
 
Mode 1 had the smallest damping ratio. The frequency was 0.73 Hz, and the 
damping ratio was 1.11%. According to Table 2.8, West G1 and East G1 are 
primarily involved in this mode. Mode 2 had a frequency of 1.06 Hz and a 
damping ratio of 5.83% with all generators involved in the mode, exhibited in 
Table 2.9. Mode 3 had a frequency of 1.20 Hz and a damping ratio of 6.32%. 
Generator South G1 was involved most in this mode, as presented in Table 2.10. 
As seen in Figure 2.18 through Figure 2.23, machine learning estimated results 
agree well with the generated simulations. Additionally, the change in damping 
ratio for each of the three selected modes over the 24-hour period is presented in 
Table 2.11. Each individual generator’s real power output and the system total 
real power output are also provided in Table 2.11. In general, the higher the 
participation factor of an individual machine for a particular mode, the more the 
change in damping ratio follows the change in the machine’s real power output. 
For example, West G1 and East G1 were most involved in Mode 1. It can be 
seen in Table 2.11 that the change in damping ratio for this mode most closely 
follows the generation dispatch of West G1 and East G1. 
  
Summary  
As stated in UTK’s task for the MIDAS project, the goal was to determine the 
data-driven-based security assessment criteria using model integration. This task 
was completed by developing cases, based on the NREL-provided 18-bus 
system, for training and testing a machine-learning algorithm. Security 
assessment criteria was determined for frequency, transient, and small-signal 
stability. Stability conditions were set based upon typical definitions for each of 






Table 2.8. Participation factor of generators in Mode 1 
Generator Participation Factor 
West G1 1.00 
East G1 0.60 
South G1 0.09 
North G1 H1 0.01 















Table 2.9. Participation factor of generators in Mode 2 
Generator Participation Factor 
North G1 H1 1.00 
North G2 H2 0.88 
East G1 0.63 
West G1 0.41 














Table 2.10. Participation factor of generators in Mode 3 
Generator Participation Factor 
South G1 1.00 
North G1 H1 0.16 
North G2 H2 0.14 
East G1 0.13 



























3 ASSESSING SECURITY DURING NATURAL DISASTERS AND 
INCREASED RENEWABLE PENETRATION IN PUERTO RICO 
This section covers the development of the 2018 model of the PREPA 
transmission system for the purpose of analyzing the current system’s 
vulnerabilities. Once the 2018 system was developed, several dynamic 
simulations were performed on the model. After the 2018 system model was 
created and analyzed, additional models were provided by DOE, including likely 
modifications to be made to the system. The model selected for study was a day-
peak case for the year 2022. Since actual machine parameters were provided in 
the 2022 model, more system detail was available for study. The effects of 
increased solar penetration were studied on the 2022 model. 
 
 
Development of the 2018 Puerto Rico Power Transmission 
System Study Model 
This system is based off of PREPA’s transmission system on the main island in 
2018, shown in Figure 3.1. Buses were named according to their geographic 
locations, with each bus representing a substation and voltage level. The two 
voltage levels in the PSS®E model are 230kV and 115kV. A summary of the 
system is shown in Table 3.1. 
 
3.1.1 The Power Flow Model of the Puerto Rico Power Transmission 
System 
3.1.1.1 Generation 
The generation plants in Table 3.2 were modeled based upon information 
provided by PREPA [38]. Each plant was modeled as a separate machine with 
the maximum real power output (PMax) set as each plant’s nameplate capacity 1. 
For power dispatch for the base case scenario, the real power output (Pout) for 
each generator was set as 75% of the PMax. In addition, reactive power limits: 
QMax and QMin, were adjusted individually for each generator according to the 




                                            


































Generator Bus  Name Type Capacity (MW) 
4 MAYAGUEZ PLA115.00 Gas 220 
9 PONCE       115.00 Solar 2.1 
10 DOS BOCAS   115.00 Hydro 10 
11 CAONILLAS   115.00 Hydro 21.5 
15 VEGA BAJA   115.00 Gas 42 
30 PUNTA LIMA  115.00 Wind 26 
31 RIO BLANCO  115.00 Hydro 5 
39 JOBOS       115.00 Gas 42 
40 SANTA ISABEL115.00 Wind 75 
43 TORO NEGRO  115.00 Hydro 10.56 
47 PALO SECO   115.00 Steam 602 
47 PALO SECO   115.00 Gas 126 
48 SAN JUAN    115.00 Combined Cycle 440 
48 SAN JUAN    115.00 Steam 400 
49 AES IIUMINA 115.00 Solar 20 
58 COSTA SUR P 115.00 Steam 990 
58 COSTA SUR P 115.00 Gas 42 
59 ECOELCTRICA 115.00 Gas 507 
61 CAMB PLANT  115.00 Gas 248 
68 AES PLANT   115.00 Gas 454 
69 AGUIRRE P   115.00 Steam 900 
69 AGUIRRE P   115.00 Gas 42 
69 AGUIRRE P   115.00 Combined Cycle 592 
81 YABUCOA PLAN115.00 Gas 42 
83 SALINA SOLAR115.00 Solar 16 
85 ORIANA SOLAR115.00 Solar 45 
86 SAN FERMIN S115.00 Solar 27 
87 YAUCO       115.00 Hydro 25 
88 GARZAS      115.00 Hydro 12.24 





A map of the Puerto Rico 2018 transmission system is shown in Figure 3.1. 
Transmission line impedances and susceptances were calculated using the 
geographic distance of each branch in miles2, with the conversion factors 
provided in Table 3.3. To do this, each bus was assigned a global positioning 
system (GPS) coordinate in latitude and longitude degrees. The Haversine 
formula can be used to calculate the great-circle distance between two points, 
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 𝑐 = 2 ∗ 𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑛2(√𝑎, √(1 − 𝑎))  
 𝑑 = 𝑅 ∗ 𝑐 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜑 = 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒, 𝜆 = 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒, 𝑅 = 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡ℎ′𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑘𝑚, 
𝑑 = 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠, 
 
 𝑎 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠  
 
The line impedance and susceptance parameters in p.u. per mile were assumed 
as values shown in Table 3.3 for each voltage level. 
 
3.1.1.3 Load 
Load data was approximated using population data. First, population data was 
collected for each area in which a substation was located. Each area’s population 
was then divided by the total population to estimate the percentage of total 
system load that each bus’s load accounted for. The peak demand of the Puerto 
Rico power system was given as 3,265 MW [38]. This peak demand value was 
multiplied by the population percentage of each bus to derive each bus’s 
individual real power load (Pload) value. It was assumed that the power factor for 
each bus is 0.98. The load value for each bus is given in Table 3.4. 
 
3.1.2 The Power Flow Solution 
After the power flow model and parameters were prepared, the steady-state 
power flow was solved to obtain a converged power flow solution. Using the Full 
Newton-Raphson method with a flat start, the convergence information during 
each iteration is given in Figure 3.2. 
 
                                            
2 Although some branches in the real system are not perfectly linear, the geographic distances 
and voltage ratings were used to obtain transmission line parameters as the best estimation 




Table 3.3. Transmission line resistance, reactance, and susceptance in p.u. per mile 
Voltage level R X B 
115kV 0.00054 0.0030 0.00048 
230kV 0.00017 0.0016 0.0035 
 
 
Table 3.4. Load value for each bus derived from population distribution in Puerto Rico 









1 Aguadilla 60,316 2.382% 77.77 
2 Añasco 29,281 1.157% 37.78 
3 San Sebastian 42,092 1.663% 54.30 
5 Acacias 54,507 2.153% 70.30 
6 San German 35,254 1.393% 45.48 
7 Guanica 19,115 0.755% 24.65 
8 Canas 34,065 1.346% 43.95 
9 Ponce 149,028 5.887% 192.21 
10 Dos Bocas 8,331 0.329% 10.74 
12 Hatillo 42,224 1.668% 54.46 
13 Cambalache 131 0.005% 0.16 
14 Barceloneta 25,013 0.988% 32.26 
15 Vega Baja 59,172 2.337% 76.30 
16 Dorado 38,524 1.522% 49.69 
19 Il Tejas 46,528 1.838% 60.01 
20 Venzuela 74,490 2.942% 96.06 
21 Hato Rey 20,867 0.824% 26.90 
23 Berwind 3,006 0.119% 3.89 
24 M Pena 415 0.016% 0.52 
25 Viaducto 6,170 0.244% 7.97 
26 Isla Grande 753 0.030% 0.98 
28 Palmer  1,032 0.041% 1.34 
29 Fajardo 36,499 1.442% 47.08 
30 Daguao 1,838 0.073% 2.38 
32 Humacao 58,189 2.298% 75.03 
33 Juncos 40,609 1.604% 52.37 
35 Bairoa 2,365 0.093% 3.04 




Table 3.4. Continued 









38 Cayey 48,065 1.899% 62.00 
40 Santa Isabel 23,389 0.924% 30.17 
41 Comerio 20,779 0.821% 26.81 
42 Barranquitas 30,402 1.201% 39.21 
43 Toro Negro 1,399 0.055% 1.80 
44 Juana Diaz 50,676 2.002% 65.37 
48 San Juan 355,074 14.025% 457.92 
50 Mora 161,884 6.394% 208.76 
52 Arecibo 94,658 3.739% 122.08 
54 Mayaguez 87,712 3.465% 113.13 
56 Guayanilla 21,368 0.844% 27.56 
62 Pfizer 108,862 4.300% 140.40 
63 Manatí 43,772 1.729% 56.45 
65 Salinas 30,981 1.224% 39.96 
67 Guyama 45,345 1.791% 58.48 
72 Aguas Buenas 28,599 1.130% 36.89 
74 Bayamón 189,159 7.472% 243.96 
76 Yabucoa 37,655 1.487% 48.55 
80 Manuabo 12,225 0.483% 15.77 











According to the transmission power flow of the Puerto Rico system, contour 
maps were generated to visually show the real and reactive power at each bus, 
along with the real and reactive power flow in the lines, as seen in Figure 3.3 to 
Figure 3.6. From the contour maps, it is confirmed that real power consumption is 
highest in the northern part of the island. Real power flow is also highest on the 
transmission lines coming from the south of the island where most of the power 
is generated. 
 
3.1.3 Overview of the Dynamics of the Puerto Rico Power Transmission 
System 
The dynamics of the Puerto Rico system were generated using typical generator, 
exciter, and turbine governor dynamic models based on the plant type: thermal3, 
hydroelectric, or renewables. The models used for each generation type are 
summarized in Table 3.5. Since the capacities of hydro power plants in the 
Puerto Rico power grid are small, no turbine governors are considered and 
modeled for hydro power plants. Solar power plants use the generic PV dynamic 
model developed by General Electric. Wind power plants apply the Type 3 
(doubly-fed induction generator) wind turbine generator model, also from General 
Electric. For all thermal plants, frequency deadbands have been modeled into the 
turbine governors. Specific model parameters for each model can be found in the 
dynamic file. 
 
3.1.4 Dynamic Simulations Performed on the Developed 2018 PREPA 
Transmission Model 
To test the dynamic model and better understand the impact of various 
contingencies on the system, a few dynamic simulations were run. First, a base 
case with no contingencies was simulated. As seen in Figure 3.7, the system 
frequency stays at 60 Hz at the steady state. 
 
Next, a few dynamic simulations were tested to examine system response after 
contingencies.  
 
Generation Trip: The first contingency was tripping the Costa Sur steam plant 
located in Guayanilla, a municipality located in southern coast of the island (as 
displayed in Figure 3.8). This plant is loaded at about 681 MW in steady state 
conditions. A drop in frequency can be seen in Figure 3.9 due to the loss of 
generation. The frequency nadir is close to 59.3 Hz, which is a value of typical 
under-frequency-load-shedding thresholds in contiguous U.S. power grids. 
 
  
                                            
3 In this first-stage study, all thermal plant machines (gas, steam, and combined cycled) were 

































Table 3.5. Generator dynamic models in the Puerto Rico power system model 





Gas, Steam, and 
Combined Cycle 
GENROU EXPIC1 URGS3T 
Hydro GENSAL SCRX None 
Solar GEPVG GEPVE None 





















Load Shedding: In the second contingency, load at a substation was tripped in 
Caguas, a city and municipality of Puerto Rico located south of San Juan (as 
shown in Figure 3.10). The tripped load amount is 198 MW. An increase in 
frequency can be seen in Figure 3.11 after the load shedding. As this load 
shedding amount is relatively small, this frequency deviation is within the safe 
range of the typical over-frequency protection relay setting for generators. 
 
Bus/Branch Fault: Bus fault and branch fault contingency simulations were also 
performed. A zero-impedance fault was applied for both the bus and branch at 1 
second and then cleared at 1.05 seconds. The bus fault occurred at the 115kV 
bus at the Hato Rey substation (Figure 3.14), a densely populated barrio in the 
municipality of San Juan. The branch fault occurred on the 230kV transmission 
line connecting Guayanilla and Manatí (Figure 3.15), a municipality on the 
northern coast. Results for the bus fault are shown in Figure 3.13 and Figure 
3.14, and results for the branch fault are presented in Figure 3.16 and Figure 
3.17. For both fault contingencies, the system frequency had an increase due to 
the acceleration of the generator rotors, followed by a ring-down process after 
clearing the fault. Additionally, for the transmission fault contingency, a local 
oscillation can be observed during frequency restoration, seen in Figure 3.16. 
 
Substation Failure: The Santa Isabel substation was tripped. Santa Isabel is a 
municipality located near the southern coast of the island (as shown in Figure 
3.18). This plant is loaded at about 34 MW and has 49.5 MW of generation in the 
steady state condition. This generation is from a wind farm in Santa Isabel with a 
capacity of 75 MW. A drop in frequency can be seen Figure 3.19 due to the loss 
of generation and the fact that the total generation loss from this bus is greater 
than the total load loss. 
 
Corridor Trip: A few major corridors, or clusters, of transmission lines were 
tripped. The transmission lines selected for each group act as key pathways to 
transmit power from major generation buses in the south to large load buses in the 
north. After individual clusters were tripped, groups of two adjacent clusters were 
tripped at the same time. The purpose of these simulations is to show what would 
happen if a natural disaster, such as a hurricane, would trip a group of main 
transmission lines.  
 
After each simulation was run, a branch loading report was generated to see if 
any branches in the system were over 100% of their rating and if any bus 



































Figure 3.15. Map of Puerto Rico indicating approximate 230kV transmission path from Guayanilla 







Figure 3.16. Frequency response after a three-phase short-circuit fault on the Guayanilla- Manatí 




Figure 3.17. System voltage after a three-phase short-circuit fault on the Guayanilla-Manati 





















































































Table 3.6. Branch overload and out-of-limit voltage report from corridor trip simulations 
Cluster(s) 
Tripped 
Branch Overload Results Out-of-Limit Voltage Results 
Cluster 1 
No branches above 100% of 
rated loading 
No buses outside of 0.95 p.u. 
and 1.05 p.u. 
Cluster 2 
1 transformer branch 
overloaded: Salinas A and 
Salinas B – 103.0% of Rate1 
loading 
No buses outside of 0.95 p.u. 
and 1.05 p.u. 
Cluster 3 
No branches above 100% of 
rated loading 
No buses outside of 0.95 p.u. 
and 1.05 p.u. 
Cluster 4 
No branches above 100% of 
rated loading 
No buses outside of 0.95 p.u. 
and 1.05 p.u. 
Clusters 1 and 4 
No branches above 100% of 
rated loading 
No buses outside of 0.95 p.u. 
and 1.05 p.u. 
Clusters 1 and 2 
1 transformer branch 
overloaded: Salinas A and 
Salinas B – 100.1% of Rate1 
loading 
No buses outside of 0.95 p.u. 
and 1.05 p.u. 
Clusters 2 and 3 
1 transformer branch 
overloaded: Salinas A and 
Salinas B – 102.3% of Rate1 
loading 
No buses outside of 0.95 p.u. 
and 1.05 p.u. 
Clusters 3 and 4 
No branches above 100% of 
rated loading 
No buses outside of 0.95 p.u. 






Though the system appears to be relatively robust during corridor trips, these 
results will need to be validated by real-time frequency and voltage 
measurements from deployed UGA units. Further detail regarding the placement 
of UGA sensors is provided in Section 3.2. Additionally, equipment parameters 
may need to be adjusted to more truly reflect the PREPA system. 
 
3.1.5 PPREPA Transmission System Mapping 
To better visualize the PREPA 2018 transmission model, and more easily 
compare connections to the transmission map in Figure 3.1, a map of the system 
was generated in ArcMap software. Each substation was assigned an 
approximate GPS coordinate based on its geographic location. Buses and 
branches were mapped in ArcMap, as displayed in Figure 3.32. To do this, bus 
and branch coordinates were imported as layers into ArcMap. Branches were 
assumed to be linear between each bus. The two voltage levels are indicated by 
distinct colors, where 115kV is red, and 230kV is blue.  
 
Placement of Universal Grid Analyzer (UGA) Measurements 
for Dynamic Model Validation 
The UGA is low-cost, GPS-synchronized device that measures highly accurate 
frequency, voltage, phase angle, and power quality measurements. UGAs are a 
part of the FNET/GridEye system, which is a wide-area power system frequency 
network of grid measurement devices. UGAs are installed by connecting the 
device to a standard 120V electrical outlet and connecting a GPS antenna for 
data synchronization. Although UGAs are directly connected at the distribution 
level, a network of UGAs can provide both wide-area and local event location 
and detection. 
 
A more accurate power grid model will facilitate many advanced operation and 
planning functions in the control center of the PREPA system. Since the UGA 
has the capability to capture power grid behaviors accurately, this work will 
deploy UGA units in the PREPA system and use measurement data to validate 
the PREPA system model. Additionally, it is predicted that the Puerto Rico power 
grid will likely see a large increase in solar and other renewables in the next 2-10 
years. It is necessary to have models with high renewable penetration to forecast 
any system stability problems. Deployment of these sensors can provide 











UGAs in the Puerto Rico system can collect data system-wide and share data 
with Puerto Rico power engineers to assist them in their system performance 
assessment and system enhancement effort. Currently there are four UGA units 
deployed. Eighteen locations were proposed as sites for installation of additional 
units. Possible locations include a few large generation plants, large load areas, 
and hydro plants, along with a solar farm and wind farm.  
 
Several criteria were involved in sensor placement, including the following: 
monitoring locations with high generation, monitoring locations with high load, 
geographically placing sensors to cover the island, and placing sensors near a 
variety of generation sources and renewable machines. Additionally, sensors 
were requested to be placed near transmission substations with 
telecommunications capabilities. Table 3.7 lists existing locations, Table 3.8 lists 
proposed locations, and Figure 3.33 geographically shows both existing and 
proposed UGA locations. 
 
To provide examples of how this monitoring system can assist PREPA and other 
stakeholders in grid-wide and local situational awareness, a few system events 
are shown in following figures. An outage was reported in the Mayaguez region 
on 08/02/2018 around 4:51 UTC, as shown in Figure 3.34 Looking at the results 
from the measured data, there was a drop in frequency due to the loss of 
generation at the Mayaguez power plant, and frequency swings are evident as 
the system tries to stabilize to a settling frequency. Fast frequency ramp-up and 
local oscillations are also very common in the system, as shown in Figure 3.35 
and Figure 3.36. In Figure 3.35, the increase in frequency suggests either a load 
drop or fast frequency ramp up occurred. Local oscillations in the system are 
common. An example of a local oscillation is shown in Figure 3.36, indicated by 
fluctuations in measured frequency. 
 
A more systematic analysis of PREPA measurement will be carried out in Phase 
II. Additionally, data from UGAs deployed in Puerto Rico will be used to validate 
and refine the UTK-developed 2018 model and PREPA-developed models of the 
system. To validate the models, events captured by UGAs can be simulated. 
Simulated results will reveal differences between model parameters and the 
actual system. Model parameters can then be modified to more closely match the 




Table 3.7. Existing Puerto Rico UGA Locations 
Existing UGA Locations 
UGA Number Location 
1 Mayaguez 
2 Yauco 





Table 3.8. Proposed Puerto Rico UGA Locations 
Proposed UGA Locations 








8 Martín Peña 







16 Juan Martín 
17 Juncos 












Figure 3.34. Frequency measured by UGAs during generation trip event followed by power 




Figure 3.35. Frequency measured by UGAs during fast frequency ramp up or possible load drop 






Figure 3.36. Frequency measured by UGAs during local oscillation detected on 08/02/2018 at 







Dynamic Simulations Performed on the 2022 PREPA-
Developed Model 
After developing the transmission model for PREPA’s 2018 model, additional 
models, developed by PREPA and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
(PNNL), were provided. These models were based on PREPA’s system 
expected for years 2019, 2021, and 2022 but were developed before the 
hurricane occurred. Therefore, an additional model needed to be developed to 
represent the system as it was before the hurricane, along with other models that 
could represent the system during and after the rebuilding process. Before other 
post-hurricane models were created, one of the PREPA-developed models was 
used for study. The 2022 day-peak model was selected because it reflects the 
system’s behavior under peak demand. A benefit of using the PREPA-developed 
model is increased detail of the model and equipment parameters. The 2022 
PREPA-developed model contains 1,394 buses at the transmission, 
subtransmission, and distribution levels, with 91 in-service machines.   
 
Branch corridor trips, similar to what were performed on the 2018 model, were 
simulated on the 2022 model. Since the 2022 model has a greater number of 
buses, more voltage levels, and different topology than the 2018 model, results 
are not directly comparable between the two models. Out of all branch corridor 
trip combinations, the worst case was tripping the clusters indicated in Figure 
3.37, with overloading occurring at 27 buses in the system mostly at the 38kV 
level. The frequency response after tripping these branches is provided in Figure 
3.38. These results show the criticality of the main branches that transfer power 
from the key generation facilities to the main load areas. 
 
As Puerto Rico continues to rebuild their grid after recent hurricanes, increased 
solar penetration is expected to be integrated in the system. In the PREPA-
developed 2022 peak demand case, the generation mix is approximately 29% 
renewable, when considering the real power output of in-service machines. 
Penetration was increased by approximately 20% each time by replacing non-
renewable machines with real power output equal to approximately 20% of total 
generation. To substitute non-renewable machine models in the dynamic file, the 
generator model for the replaced machine was set to GEPVG, and the exciter 
model was set to GEPVE. These models are generic PV dynamic models 
developed by General Electric. Typical parameters for the GEPVG and GEPVE 











Figure 3.38. Frequency response of tripping worst-case corridor trip combination for 2022 
PREPA-developed model 
 
Table 3.9. Typical parameters for GEPVG model 
Parameter Value 
Xeq-equivalent reactance for current injection 99999 
VHVRCR2- HVRCR voltage 2 1.2 
CURHVRCR2- Max reactive current at VHVRCR2 2.0 
Rlp_LVPL-Rate of active current change 5.0 
T_LVPL-Voltage sensor for LVPL 0.02 
LVPL voltage 1 0.0 
LVPL power 1 0.0 
LVPL voltage 2 0.5 
LVPL power 2 0.167 
LVPL voltage 3 0.9 








Table 3.10. Typical parameters for GEPVE model 
Parameter Value 
Tfv  - V-regulator filter 0.15 
Kpv  - V-regulator proportional gain 18.0 
Kiv  - V-regulator integrator gain 5.0 
Rc  - line drop compensation resistance 0.0 
Xc  - line drop compensation reactance 0.0 
QMX - V –regulator max limit 1.0 
QMN - V –regulator min limit -1.0 
IPMAX – Max active current limit 1.12 
TRV - V-sensor 0.02 
KQi – MVAR/Volt gain 0.1 
VMINCL 0.88 
VMAXCL 1.15 
KVi – VoltMVAR gain 120 
XIQmin - min. limit for Eq’cmd 0.55 
XIQmax – max. limit for Eq’cmd 1.55 
TV  - Lag time constant in WindVar Controller 0.05 
Tp  - Pelec filter in fast PF controller 0.05 
Fn  - A portion of the on-line  PV controllers 1.0 
ImaxTD – Converter current limit 1.12 
Iphl - Hard active current limit 1.12 
Iqhl - Hard reactive current limit 1.12 
Tlpqd - Reactive droop time constant 5.0 
Kqd - Reactive droop gain 0.0 
Xqd - Reactive droop synthesizing Impedance 0.0 
Vermx - Reactive power control  maximum error 
signal 
0.01 
Vermn - Reactive power control  minimum error signal -0.01 
Vfrz - Reactive power control freeze voltage 0.7 
PFAFLG: (=1 if PF fast control enabled) 0.0 
VARFLG: (=1 if Qord is provided by SolarVar) 1.0 






The solar penetration of the system was increased by replacing more non-
renewable machines with solar. The graphs in Figure 3.39, Figure 3.40, and 
Figure 3.41 show the dynamic effects of tripping a machine at the Ecosteam 
Power Plant, 98.5 MW of generation, at various penetration levels without relays 
incorporated into the model. Frequency of each machine was monitored. From 
the results, it can be seen that the frequency nadir, or minimum post-contingency 
frequency, decreases as solar penetration increases. 
 
Additionally, frequency does not appear to settle for a long duration, even after 
30 seconds, in cases with higher solar levels. These results infer the system 
becomes less stable with increased penetration. Because large rotating 
machines are being replaced with solar, some inertia in the system is lost. 
Frequency nadir and setting frequency are directly affected by system inertia 
level. 
 
These simulations were repeated with the inclusion of load and line relays in the 
system. Under-frequency load and line relays were included in the original 2022 
PREPA-developed model. The load relay protection model was DLSHBL. This 
protection model was only added to some of the load buses at the 38kV level. 
The parameters for each DLSHBL protection model, listed in Table 3.11, varied 
for each individual load so that different loads were shed at specified frequencies 
and times. UFLT relays were set so that if the frequency, measured at a certain 
bus, dropped below a threshold for the duration of the under-frequency timer, a 
specified branch would trip. The main parameters for this model include the 
under-frequency threshold, under-frequency timer, and the bus for the frequency 
measurement. Machine voltage and frequency relays were not included in this 
model. System frequency response of tripping 98.5 MW, with relays included in 
the model, is presented in Figure 3.42, Figure 3.43, and Figure 3.44. Load and 
line under-frequency relays reduced the magnitude of swings in frequency seen 
in the system and increased the frequency nadir. Despite this, frequency nadir 
still drops with increased solar penetration. Sustained oscillations are also seen 
for cases with more solar.  
 
Summary 
Through this project, UTK was able to provide DOE with a 2018 transmission 
study model based on data provided in PREPA’s Fourteenth Annual Report and 
operational profile provided on their website. Additionally, system security was 
assessed through corridor trip simulations and increased solar penetration. 
These studies provided DOE with more insight into with what areas of the system 






Figure 3.39. Frequency response of tripping 98.5 MW in 2022 PREPA-developed system with 




Figure 3.40. Frequency response of tripping 98.5 MW in 2022 PREPA-developed system with 






Figure 3.41. Frequency response of tripping 98.5 MW in 2022 PREPA-developed system with 
72% renewable penetration 
 
Table 3.11. Parameters for DLSHBL load under-frequency protection model 
Con Number Con Description 
1 f1, first load shed point (Hz) 
2 t1, first point pickup time (Sec.) 
3 frac1, first fraction of load shed 
4 f2, second load shed point (Hz) 
5 t2, second point pickup time (Sec.) 
6 frac2, second fraction of load shed 
7 f3, third load shed point (Hz) 
8 t3, third point pickup time (Sec.) 
9 frac3, third fraction of load shed 
10 TB, breaker time (Sec.) 
11 df1, first rate of freq. shed pt. (Hz/sec.) (>=0) 
12 df2, second rate of freq. shed pt. (Hz/sec.) (>=0) 







Figure 3.42. Frequency response of tripping 98.5 MW in 2022 PREPA-developed system with 




Figure 3.43. Frequency response of tripping 98.5 MW in 2022 PREPA-developed system with 







Figure 3.44. Frequency response of tripping 98.5 MW in 2022 PREPA-developed system with 





ASSESSING SECURITY DURING CYBER-ATTACKS AND 
WIDE-AREA PHYSICAL ATTACKS ON BULK ELECTRIC 
SYSTEM ASSETS 
The focus of the study was to analyze the effects of targeted attacks on 
substations, or a specific group of substations. It was assumed that the intended 
attack was successful and that contingencies have occurred. This security 
assessment primarily focuses on dynamic frequency stability immediately 
following a major contingency. The study involves two main parts: 1) creating a 
geographic map representing the system model used in the study and 2) 
performing possible cyber-attack scenarios and analyzing the system’s response. 
 
Literature Review 
On December 23rd, 2015, the first successful cyber-induced power outage that 
disrupted an electric power grid occurred in Ukraine. Up to 225,000 customers 
were affected over the 6-hour period of the attack, with more than 50 substations 
impacted [44]. The primary equipment remotely operated within the substations 
were circuit breakers [45]. Most of these stations were at the transmission and 
sub-transmission level. For 3 hours following attack, 7 110kV and 23 35kV 
substations were disconnected [45].  
 
The success of an attack on the bulk electric system reiterates the enforcement 
of North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (CIP) standards, which involve identifying, categorizing, and protecting 
critical assets. The attack also revealed how vulnerable the power grid can be 
and what catastrophic consequences a cyber-attack could have. Some of the 
largest electric utilities in the U.S. cover a huge territory and serve millions of 
customers, which makes them potential targets of hackers. For example, 
Dominion Energy’s generating facilities produce approximately 31 GW electric 
power and its network consists of 93,600 miles of transmission and distribution 
lines [46]. If a hacker manages to hack into a large electric utility’s control center 
into the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, catastrophic 
consequences could occur. Although the SCADA Internet Protocol (IP) 
communication network should be separated from other corporate networks, 
hackers can gain access to SCADA at either the supervisory control level or the 
direct control level. The supervisory control level is comprised of a user interface 
that allows operators to monitor and control system equipment; the direct control 
level contains devices, such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and 
remote terminal units (RTUs) that actuate system equipment under specified 




encryption data protocols are not used for data transmission, or devices are not 
properly password protected, these controllers could be vulnerable to an attack 
[47]. 
 
Threats of an attack of from an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) are also a major 
concern. An EMP is a nuclear weapon detonated in the upper atmosphere so 
that a pulse causes interference with electronic devices across a large 
geographic area [48]. The effects of an EMP depend on the size of the weapon, 
along with the altitude at which the EMP is detonated. In some cases, an EMP 
may be able to take out an area as big as an entire large city, or country in some 
cases. A geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) is caused by solar flares and 
associated coronal mass injections, or solar storms [49]. A GMD induces 
transmission lines with additional, unregulated current, causing mechanical 
failures and power outages [49].  
 
According to previous research in cyber-attacks on bulk electric systems, more 
research is needed to predict stability of several combinations of hypothesized 
attacks, such as tripping multiple substations, considering both their steady-state 
and dynamic effects [50]. This would reduce the number of permutations of 
possible attacks and identify critical points in the system. Previous studies have 
developed algorithms, such as the reverse pyramid model, to identify 
combinations of critical substations, that when disconnected could cause 
cascading outages [51]. Though these methods are useful for classifying 
substations as critical or non-critical based on power flow, they do not always 
recognize dynamic behaviors that may cause instability. Dynamic security 
assessment is necessary because even though a system may converge in power 
flow, the system may not be dynamically stable after certain contingencies have 
occurred. In past research that looks at both power flow and dynamic study of 
cyber-attacks, substations are classified as being critical or non-critical. In one 
study, dynamic effects are created by the sequence of switching actions. Further 
research is needed to determine critical switching actions that would cause the 
system to become unstable, even if a system could still be defined as stable in 
steady state [50]. Therefore, in this study, dynamic stability of the system is 
assessed while multiple substations are switched offline at once in various 
configurations to create more vulnerable scenarios. 
 
Development of the Atlantis 9000 Model Mapping for the 
Purpose of Cyber-Security System Study 
4.1.1 Introduction of Atlantis 9000 Model 
The purpose of the Atlantis 9000 model was to assign GPS coordinates to a 
system in PSS®E where GPS coordinates are not provided, and then display the 




to geographically display the size of a critical contingency. The model is named 
Atlantis because the system is mapped to represent an imaginary island, and 
9000 is the approximate number of buses in the system. Two different methods 
were used to generate a map of the system: 1) programmatic conversion of 
PSS®E Cartesian coordinates to GPS coordinates and 2) Power Systems 
Graphic Toolbox (PSGT) developed by Dr. Zhuohong Pan.  
 
4.1.2 Programmatic Conversion of PSS®E Cartesian Coordinates to GPS 
Coordinates 
4.1.2.1 Step 1: Mapping in PSS®E 
The Auto-Draw function in PSS®E allows a user to create a diagram centered on 
a bus and then grow the diagram up to 15 levels from the center bus. In the 
following example, a system containing 9,241 buses is shown. To include all 
9,241 buses in the diagram, the diagram was expanded several times. This was 
achieved by selecting a border bus as the center bus and growing the diagram 
15 levels from this bus. A full diagram containing all buses and branches in the 
system is presented in Figure 4.1. 
 
4.1.2.2 Step 2: Conversion of Bus Cartesian Coordinates to GPS Coordinates 
Cartesian coordinates of a diagram in PSS®E can be extracted by exporting bus 
locations as Cartesian coordinates. These coordinates were saved into a PSS®E 
location file and then copied into a Python script. The Python script converted the 
Cartesian coordinates to GPS coordinates by assigning a scale of the X and Y 
coordinates to latitude and longitude, respectively. A GPS origin was provided so 
that the user could assign where to center the map on the globe. In the example 
provided, the origin was specified as a point in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean 
since the diagram did not geographically correspond to any geographic 
continent. A rotation function was also included so the system could be rotated 
90 degrees clockwise. The modified coordinates were then written to a CSV file.  
 
4.1.2.3 Step 3: Displaying System in Google Earth 
In Google Earth, a list of GPS coordinates, in latitude/longitude pairs, can be 
imported from a CSV file, as long as “Latitude” and “Longitude” are given as the 
first two column headings and each corresponding points are underneath these 
headings. A map of the system in Google Earth is shown in Figure 4.2 
 
4.1.3 Mapping the System Using PSGT 
PSGT is a tool developed by Dr. Zhuohong Pan. The purpose of the tool is to 
locate substations and transmission lines on a map with computer-aided design 
to display data and results. PSGT displays power grids based on GPS 
coordinates of the system; draws lines according to the topology; and color-



















A more detailed description of how to use the tool is in the Appendix in Section 
A.4. The 9,241-bus system mapped previously in Google Earth was also mapped 
in the PSGT tool. The system is color-coded by zone and by voltage levels in 
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, respectively. The 9,241-bus system contains 24 zones 
and 9 voltage levels ranging from 110kV-750kV. Zone 1 acts as an 
interconnection between the other 23 zones. 
 
Modeling Dynamic Effects of Possible Cyber-Attack 
Scenarios  
The Atlantis 9000 model was used for all simulations in studying the effects of 
cyber-attack scenarios. The simulations performed could imitate someone 
hacking into a large electric utility, attacking a Regional Transmission 
Organization (RTO) or Independent Service Organization (ISO), or even creating 
a cascading cyber-attack. An example of a cascading cyber-attack would be if a 
group of cyber-attackers hack into more than one electric utilities/RTO/ISO in an 
organized way. In this case, the entire interconnection may be in danger because 
of the system synchronization. Though many types and combinations of 
contingencies could be introduced during a cyber-attack, worst case scenarios 
were considered, starting from tripping the largest generators, loads, or major 
substations within areas of the system. During the initial phases of this project, 
frequency and voltage stability issues were the focus of this impact evaluation 
study, although small-signal, and transient stability issues could also be 
considered. The base frequency of the Atlantis 9000 model is 50 Hz. The system 
contains 353,178.8 MW of total generation and 340,610.8 MW of total load. 
 
4.1.4 Scenario #1: Tripping Largest Generation Facilities within a Given 
Zone 
This scenario simulates the effects of a hacker obtaining access to a large 
electric utility’s control center. In this part, dynamic simulations were conducted 
to investigate the impacts of shutting down multiple generation facilities within an 
electric utility. 
 
For example, in Zone 6, all generation facilities over a specified real power output 
were tripped in each simulation. Zone 6 had 133 machines with a combined real 
power output of approximately 38,779 MW. The threshold was adjusted until a 
boundary between convergence and divergence of the system was obtained. 
 
From the results, the system diverged when tripping generator buses with output 
greater than 565 MW and converged when changing this threshold to 570 MW. 
The results, summarized in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, show the boundary of 













Table 4.1. Summary of simulations results from tripping generator buses with output greater than 
570 MW in Zone 6 
Threshold (MW) 570 
Total Tripped (MW) 14131.02 
Total Generation in Zone (MW) 39778.96 
Percentage of Generation in 
Zone Tripped 35.52% 
Percentage of Generation in 






















Figure 4.6. System voltage while tripping generators with output greater than 570 MW in Zone 6 
 
 
Table 4.2. Summary of simulations results from tripping generator buses with output greater than 
565 MW in Zone 6 
Threshold (MW) 565 
Total Tripped (MW) 14698.02 
Total Generation in Zone (MW) 39778.96 
Percentage of Generation in 
Zone Tripped 36.95% 
Percentage of Generation in 


















Although frequency appears to be stable when tripping generators with output 
greater than 570 MW, some buses deviate outside of stable voltage limits (0.95 
p.u.-1.05 p.u.) when approaching the border. When the threshold is changed so 
that all generators greater than 565 MW are tripped, frequency splits into two 
separate systems, and the voltage is clearly out of stable limits at several buses. 
 
Scenario #1 was repeated for several zones. The ratio of generation tripped to 
total system generation was below 10% for all cases tested, but the threshold 
and percentage of generation tripped in the zone greatly varied depending on the 
size of the zone. 
 
4.1.5 Scenario #2: Tripping Multiple High-Voltage Substations in a Given 
Zone 
An RTO/ISO coordinates, controls and monitors the operation of the electric 
transmission system encompassing a large area. If a hacker seizes an RTO/ISO 
SCADA under control using malware, he or she can remotely switch substations 
off and potentially disrupt electricity supply to several customers. In this scenario, 
a successful hacking of an RTO/ISO is simulated by tripping a number of high-
voltage substations within a large zone. 
 
As mentioned in Section 4.2, the system contains nine voltage levels ranging 
from 110kV-750kV. Because the Atlantis 9000 model is a transmission model 
without showing distribution details, load buses were typically included at the 
lower end of the transmission voltage range. Step-up transformers were also 
included in the model to increase the voltage at substations connecting 
generation facilities to the grid. Though all system voltage levels were considered 
high-voltage, substations at only the highest voltages were selected to trip. Since 
only three buses in the system were at 750kV, buses at 400kV tripped. The 
400kV buses were all located in Zone 1, which acts as the main interconnection 
between the other 23 zones.  
 
In Zone 1, there are 126 buses at 400kV. If all 126 buses are tripped, the system 
diverges. Therefore, a set number of the 400kV buses were selected to trip at 
one time. The exact 400kV buses to trip in Zone 1 were selected at random. In a 
specific example using this method, the maximum number of 400kV buses that 
could be tripped without the system diverging was 20 buses. The frequency 
response and bus voltages, monitored at the machine buses, while disconnecting 
20 400kV buses are displayed in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10.  
 
From the plots, it can be seen that frequency and voltage are stable after 
disconnecting a random set of 20 400kV buses in Zone 1. If one additional 400kV 
bus is tripped in Zone 1, system frequency and voltage are no longer stable, as 

































The system appears to split into two parts, with some machines stabilizing 
around nominal voltage and frequency, while others continue to wildly oscillate. 
The number of 400kV buses in Zone 1 tripped that cause instability vary 
depending on what set of buses are selected to trip. In some cases, even tripping 
less than 10 400kV buses could cause instability due to the criticality of the 
buses. 
 
4.1.6 Scenario #3: Radial Area Attack Created by Tripping N-Levels from 
the Largest Generator in a Given Zone  
This scenario models the effects of an EMP or strategic cyber-attack targeting a 
specific radial area of the system. The largest generator in a specified zone was 
selected as the origin point for the attack. The geographic area affected by the 
attack was expanded, in stages, to determine the point where the system would 
no longer be stable. The contingency expansion was performed by disconnecting 
buses at each level from the origin, along with the transmission lines between 
them. Although any generator in a zone could be chosen at the origin point, the 
largest generator was selected because it represents the largest N-1 
contingency. First, a simulation was run in PSS®E where the largest generator 
bus was tripped in Zone 20. Under this contingency, the frequencies of all 
machine buses in the system were monitored and plotted over a period of 20 
seconds, as seen in Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15. 
 
This scenario targets a group of directly connected substations. The goal was to 
determine the maximum amount of load and generation that could be tripped 
before the system diverged, essentially by seeing how many substations directly 
connected to the selected bus could be tripped. To do this, a series of 
contingencies were applied in stages. First, the bus containing the largest 
generator within a particular zone was tripped. The example shown in  is bus 
7979 in Zone 20. Next, every bus directly connected to the bus containing the 
largest generator was also tripped. In this example, the buses directly connected 
to bus 7979 are buses 8580, 8715, 4817, 5062, and 6790. This step was called 
Stage 1 and is represented in Figure 4.17. In Stage 2, every bus connected to 
the additional buses tripped in Stage 1 were also tripped. The buses included in 
Stage 2 are shown in Figure 4.18. Five buses are connected to buses 8580, 
8715, 4817, 5062, and 6790. 
 
Simulations were run for each additional contingency stage. The size of the 
contingency was grown by one level at a time until the system diverged. The 
system frequency responses of tripping a number of bus levels from the largest 
generator in Zone 20 are included in Table 4.3 through Table 4.7. The frequency 
of every machine bus in the entire system was monitored for a period of 20 


















Figure 4.16. Atlantis 9000 model generator bus 7979 
 
 












Table 4.3. Frequency response of tripping 1 level from largest generator in Zone 20 










586 MW 1637 MW 
 
 
Table 4.4. Frequency response of tripping 2 levels from largest generator in Zone 20 















Table 4.5. Frequency response of tripping 3 levels from largest generator in Zone 20 










1929 MW 2804 MW 
 
 
Table 4.6. Frequency response of tripping 4 levels from largest generator in Zone 20 















Table 4.7. Frequency response of tripping 5 levels from largest generator in Zone 20 
























Figure 4.21. Google Earth image of entire Atlantis 9000 system buses (yellow) and buses tripped 





In Stages 2 and 3, the frequency of one machine begins to go out of sync with 
the rest of the system. This is recognized by seeing how the frequency of the 
machine diverges. Although stability seems to be maintained through Stages 1-4, 
since nearly all machine frequencies converge close to the nominal frequency of 
50 Hz, the system is clearly not stable in Stage 5. It can be concluded that the 
system becomes unstable between Stages 4 and 5, or tripping 4,008-6,369 MW 
of load and 2,988-5,292 MW of generation. Because both generation and load 
are tripped as the contingency grows beyond the origin, it is difficult to find an 
exact boundary, as far as the maximum generation and load that can be tripped 
in this scenario. 
 
Bus voltages can also be compared between Stage 4 and Stage 5. In Stage 4, 
some voltages begin to oscillate to magnitudes outside of the range 0.95-1.05 
p.u. In Stage 5, most machine bus voltages diverge well beyond this range. 
 
To show the buses tripped in Stage 5 within the entire system, an additional layer 
is added to the map developed in Google Earth. The buses tripped in Stage 5 are 
indicated by red dots. 
 
4.1.7 Scenario #4: Radial Area Attack Tripping N-Levels from the Largest 
Load in a Given Zone  
This scenario is similar to the previous one in that a radial area is tripped with a 
load bus selected as the origin point. This time, the largest load bus within a zone 
is chosen as the center of the attack. Although any load in a zone could be 
tripped, the largest load was selected because it represents a critical N-1 
contingency. A simulation was run in PSS®E where the largest load, 542 MW, 
was tripped in Zone 14. Under this contingency, the frequency of all machine 
buses in the system were monitored and plotted over a period of 20 seconds, as 
shown in Figure 4.22 and Figure 4.23. 
 
Results from tripping stages beyond the largest load in Zone 14 are shown until 
the system is unstable. System frequency response at each stage is presented in 
Table 4.8, and Table 4.9. The system frequency converged in Stage 1 but did not 
converge in Stage 2. Additionally, machine bus voltages remained stable through 
Stage 1 (Figure 4.24), staying within the range of 0.95-1.05 p.u., but were quite 
unstable in Stage 2 (Figure 4.25). The amount of total load tripped at Stage 1 
was 806 MW, and the load tripped at Stage 2 is 2,937 MW. The boundary point 
can be found by tripping only some of the additional buses tripped in Stage 2 
until the system converges again. In this specific scenario, this is more easily 
done since only load, no generation, has been tripped though Stage 2. By using 
this method, a boundary of approximately 1,500-1,600 MW of load was found, 

















Table 4.8. Frequency response of tripping 1 level from largest load in Zone 14 
 









806 MW 0 MW 
 
 
Table 4.9.Frequency response of tripping 2 levels from largest load in Zone 14 

















Figure 4.24. System voltage while tripping 1 stage from largest load in Zone 14 
 
 





As indicated by the red dots in Figure 4.26, a smaller geographic region of 
tripped buses were necessary to cause the system to become unstable. Because 
frequency is dependent upon system balance between generation and load, it is 
concluded that this may be due to the significant load drop, without any additional 
generation trip. 
 
4.1.8 Adding Generator and Load Relays into the Model During Radial 
Area Simulations 
In an actual system, relays will be connected to loads and generators. To model 
this in PSS®E and see its effect on previous simulation results, relays were 
added to all loads and machines. The LDSHAL relay model was associated with 
all loads in the system dynamic file with the parameters in Table 4.10. The 
FRGDCAT relay model was added to all machines in the system dynamic file 
with the parameters in Table 4.11. 
 
The inclusion of load and generator relays in the model did not allow many 
contingencies to expand beyond the stage where instability occurred without 
relay protection. Again, expanding the contingency from the largest generator in 
Zone 20, the results from the final stage when instability occurs are shown. In the 
previous example without relay protection, the stage where non-convergence 
occurred was Stage 5. The frequency of all machine buses is plotted, this time 
with relays added to the model. Comparing  through  to the results without relays, 
it can be seen that the relays do not have a significant effect in stabilizing the 
system at this contingency stage. 
 
Similarly, expanding the contingency from the largest load in Zone 14 was also 
performed with relays in the system. Though overall frequency deviation is 
smaller, relays do not prevent the system from diverging. According to results in 
Figure 4.29, the system machine bus frequencies appear to split into two 
separate parts. Voltage stability appeared to improve with the inclusion of relays 
for this case, as seen in Figure 4.30. 
 
When testing other zones in the system, similar results were observed, where 
frequency response somewhat improved but did not prevent the system from 
becoming unstable. This is hypothesized to be a result of both load and 
generation tripping due to under-frequency and over-frequency settings. Though 
the relays are technically implemented to bring the system back to nominal 
frequency by balancing load and generation, the tripping of these units, based 








Figure 4.26. Google Earth image of entire Atlantis 9000 system buses (yellow) and buses tripped 




Table 4.10. LDSHAL relay model parameter settings 
 
Parameter Value 
First load shed point (Hz) 59.5 
First point pickup time (sec.) 0.2 
Frac1, first fraction of load shed 0.07 
Second load shed point (Hz) 59.3 
Second point pickup time (sec.) 0.2 
Frac2, second fraction of load shed 0.07 
Third load shed point (Hz) 59.1 
Third point pickup time (sec.) 0.2 
Third fraction of load shed 0.07 






Table 4.11. FRGDCAT relay model parameter settings 
Parameter Value 
FL, lower frequency threshold (Hz) 57.8 
FU, upper frequency threshold (Hz) 61.8 
TP, relay pickup time (sec.) 0.0 




























4.1.9 Scenario #5: Tripping Buses in Multiple Areas Simultaneously 
Another type of attack could be groups of substations in two different zones 
being tripped simultaneously. For example, the largest generator in Zone 5 and 
the largest generator in Zone 22 could be disconnected at the same time. Similar 
to the previous examples, a hacker could also trip n-levels beyond a single bus in 
one area and n-levels beyond a single bus in another area. The general concept 
of this is shown in Figure 4.31. Results are presented for tripping buses in 
multiple areas simultaneously.  
 
In this example, the points of origin of the contingency are buses with the largest 
generation in Zone 5 and Zone 21. A plot was generated showing the system 
frequency response when tripping just the largest generator buses in Zone 5 and 
Zone 21. 
 
The frequency response at each stage is shown in Table 4.12 and Table 4.13. 
Though some oscillations occurred in Stage 1, the system clearly did not 
converge in Stage 2. When tripping n-levels from the largest generator in Zone 5 
and Zone 21 individually, the system became unstable in Stage 2 for Zone 5 and 
in Stage 3 for Zone 21. Due to the instability caused by the buses tripped in Zone 
5, the entire system was already unstable at Stage 2. A map generated in 
Google Earth, in Figure 4.32, shows the buses tripped the two areas in Stage 2. 
 
In other scenarios tested while tripping buses in multiple zones simultaneously, 
divergence was also reached at the stage when at least one of the areas caused 
non-convergence. Though it was previously hypothesized that tripping buses in 
multiple areas simultaneously would cause the system to more quickly reach 
instability, results inferred that instability of the entire system is dependent upon 
which area becomes unstable first for these particular scenarios. 
 
Summary 
While studying dynamic effects of possible cyber-attack scenarios, security was 
assessed by analyzing consequences of instability under the loss of several 
buses or equipment at a time. From the scenarios studied, it can be determined 
that percentage of total system generation tripped, percentage of total system 
load tripped, and number and location of substations disconnected at a specified 
voltage level can all be considered to predict dynamic stability under a cyber-
attack or wide-area physical attack. System topology and the criticality of each 





Figure 4.31. Tripping multiple areas 
 
 
Table 4.12. Frequency response of tripping 1 level from largest generator in Zones 5 and 21 















Table 4.13. Frequency response of tripping 2 levels from largest generator in Zones 5 and 21 










330 MW 4789 MW 
 
 
Table 4.14. Frequency response of tripping 3 levels from largest generator in Zones 5 and 21 
















Figure 4.32. Google Earth image of entire Atlantis 9000 system buses (yellow) and buses tripped 






Patterns can be drawn from the analyzed scenarios. For example, in the radial 
area studies, boundaries can be determined by studying the amount and location 
of load and generation tripped in the final stage before divergence and the stage 
when divergence occurs. In general for the radial area attacks, less than 1% of 
the system’s total generation or total load was tripped before divergence 
occurred. 
 
Though individual zones have differing generation and load amounts that can be 
tripped before diverging, the ratio of total load to generation lost in the zone, and 
within the entire system, could be further analyzed to observe more conclusions 
from the results. When tripping the largest generation facilities in a zone, the 
percentage of generation disconnected in the zone varied greatly depending on 
the area selected. Generally, the ratio of generation tripped to total system 






5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
WORK 
Security assessment through dynamic stability analysis was performed on three 
power systems using three different methods. In the MIDAS project, dynamic 
stability criteria was determined by generating power flow, dynamic, and 
contingency data to serve as input to a machine learning tool. The dynamic 
effects of tripping main generation facilities, loads, transmission lines, and 
substations were simulated on the developed Puerto Rico 2018 transmission 
system. Additionally, models with high PV integration were created to study the 
dynamic effects under a generation trip. Lastly, dynamic simulations were 
conducted to investigate impacts of hackers shutting down multiple generators, 
loads, or other substations within an electrical utility and determining what 
scenarios would lead to system collapse.  
 
Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA) for Multi-Timescale 
Integrated Dynamics and Scheduling for Solar (MIDAS) 
Future Work 
In the next phase of the MIDAS project, a larger model, the Western Electricity 
Coordinating Council (WECC) system, will be used to create cases for the 
machine learning tool. Test creation for this system should be more 
straightforward because the approach for case development for each stability 
method has already been determined, and Python scripts to automate tasks in 
PSS®E have already been written. Additionally, system power flow information 
will be provided for a longer period than 24 hours to better analyze stability 
changes due to seasonal effects, weather, load consumption, or other causes.  
 
As test cases are regenerated for the WECC system, improvements can be 
made to the test generation scripts to include more complex scenarios. For 
example, aside from just inertia, governor status combinations could also be 
incorporated into frequency stability analysis. Because inertia is not usually 
perfectly linear with generation level, other inputs may need to be provided into 
the machine learning model, given that a specified generation output could have 
multiple total system inertia values. Similar to what was done with the 23-bus 
system, steady-state cases could also incorporate events such as generator 
maintenance and probability of transmission line outages. 
 
Lastly, the effects of increased solar penetration will be included in the model. 
The ability of the machine learning algorithm to accurately predict frequency, 
transient, and small-signal stability margin will be assessed with a higher amount 





Assessing Security During Natural Disasters and Increased 
Renewable Penetration in Puerto Rico Future Work 
Since the UTK 2018 PREPA transmission model was created and initial PREPA-
developed models were provided for study, updated 2019 cases have been 
created by PREPA. Using these updated models, which may more accurately 
represent the system following the hurricane, corridor trip simulations and high 
PV studies, along with other contingency simulations, can be done. During the 
time this thesis was written, an additional solar penetration study was performed 
on the PREPA 2019 day-peak model, and results are included in the Appendix in 
Section A.3. In the Phase II effort, the ORNL/PREPA team will continue to deploy 
UGAs based on the locations outlined in Section 3.2. Additionally, a new project 
was started in October 2018 to develop and deploy a phasor data concentrator 
for PREPA to collect the streaming data from all UGA units in PREPA system. 
The data analytics effort will start as more data becomes available. Using this 
data, the UTK-developed 2018 model and PREPA-developed models can be 
validated.  
 
Assessing Security During Cyber-Attacks and Wide-Area 
Physical Attacks on Bulk Electric System Assets Future 
Work 
The scenarios studied are not exhaustive or comprehensive. Future work could 
be done to go through more permutations of possible attacks. Additionally, other 
dynamic characteristics, such as transient stability could be studied. The same 
scenarios could also be analyzed while varying the time that each bus is 
disconnected instead of disconnecting multiple buses or machines at once. 
Systems of various sizes and topologies could also be assessed. For example, in 
a smaller system, less generation or load could be lost to cause system collapse, 
as compared to a larger system. 
 
Lastly, a combination of system power flow data, along with dynamic response, 
could be used to predict the possible effects of tripping combinations of 
substations and other equipment. For example, [50] describes how hypothesized 
outage combinations can first go through steady-state simulation screening and 
then dynamic simulation verification to predict whether the contingency will cause 
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A.1 Python and MATLAB Scripts Used to Generate Test 
Cases in Machine Learning Project 
A.1.1 Python Scripts for 23-Bus System 
A.1.1.1 Steady-State Saved Case Generation 
#This script creates steady-state PSS/E saved cases for the 23-bus example system (savnw).  
#Load data for each zone is based off of balancing authority data, and values are scaled to fit the 23-bus 
system.  
#Line outages are scheduled based on probability, and generators are scheduled for maintenance during 
light-load periods. 
#To schedule line outages, outage probability was taken from the .prb file. A separate MATLAB script was 
used to create 








#Import load data for each zone from csv file, and scale to fit 23-bus system 
datetime = []; 
AESOload = []; 
PACWload = []; 
TEPload = []; 
with open('Load_RT_hourly.csv', 'rb') as csvfile: 
    spamreader = csv.reader(csvfile, delimiter=',', quotechar='|') 
    rowCount = 1; 
    for row in spamreader: 
        if(rowCount != 1): 
            datetime.append(row[0]); 
            AESOload.append(float(row[1])); 
            PACWload.append(float(row[20])); 
            TEPload.append(float(row[33])); 
        rowCount = rowCount + 1; 
         
AESOavg = sum(AESOload)/float(len(AESOload)) 
PACWavg = sum(PACWload)/float(len(PACWload)) 
TEPavg = sum(TEPload)/float(len(TEPload)) 
 
Area1Avg = 200.0-((max(AESOload)-AESOavg)/max(AESOload))*200.0 
Area2Avg = 2500.0-((max(PACWload)-PACWavg)/max(PACWload))*2500.0 
Area5Avg = 500.0-((max(TEPload)-TEPavg)/max(TEPload))*500.0 
 
AESOdev = []; 
PACWdev = []; 
TEPdev = []; 
 
for i in range(len(datetime)): 
    AESOdev.append((AESOload[i] - AESOavg)/AESOavg) 
    PACWdev.append((PACWload[i] - PACWavg)/PACWavg) 
    TEPdev.append((TEPload[i] - TEPavg)/TEPavg) 
     
#Schedule out-of-service machines 
f = open("machineOutages.py", "w") 
generatorMaintenance = [[3011,2037],[206,6593],[101,1052],[102,2709],[211,3400],[3018,350]] 




startingHour = 0 
for j in range(len(generatorMaintenance)): 
    for i in range(len(datetime)): 
        if((i+1) == generatorMaintenance[j][1]): 
            startingHour = i 
            machStatus = 0 
        elif(i <= (startingHour+671) and startingHour != 0): 
            machStatus = 0 
        else: 
            machStatus = 1 
            startingHour = 0 
        generatorMaintenanceSchedule.append([generatorMaintenance[j][0],(i+1),machStatus]) 
f.write(str(generatorMaintenanceSchedule)) 
             
#Schedule out-of-service branches using probability 
reactance138kV = 0.762 
reactance230kV = 0.746 
reactance500kV = 0.746 
 
fmt138kV = 0.1 
fmt230kV = 0.1 
fmt500kV = 0.1 
 
ft138kV = 0.1 
ft230kV = 0.1 
ft500kV = 0.1 
 
dt138kV = 10 
dt230kV = 10 
dt500kV = 10 
 
dmt138kV = 7 
dmt230kV = 10 
dmt500kV = 10 
 
fromBuses = psspy.abrnint(-1,1,1,1,1,'FROMNUMBER')[1][0] 
toBuses = psspy.abrnint(-1,1,1,1,1,'TONUMBER')[1][0] 
IDs = [] 
reactances = [] 
lengths = [] 
frequencies = [] 
durations = [] 
failureTimes = [] 
 
for i in range(len(fromBuses)): 
    if((fromBuses[i] == fromBuses[i-1]) and (toBuses[i] == toBuses[i-1])): 
        IDs.append('2') 
    else: 
        IDs.append('1') 
         
for i in range(len(fromBuses)): 
    reactances.append(psspy.brndt2(fromBuses[i],toBuses[i],IDs[i],'RX')[1].imag) 
 
for i in range(len(fromBuses)): 
    if(psspy.busdat(fromBuses[i],'BASE')[1] == 138): 
        length = reactances[i]/reactance138kV 
        lengths.append(length) 
    elif(psspy.busdat(fromBuses[i],'BASE')[1] == 230): 




        lengths.append(length) 
    elif(psspy.busdat(fromBuses[i],'BASE')[1] == 500): 
        length = reactances[i]/reactance500kV 
        lengths.append(length) 
 
for i in range(len(fromBuses)): 
    if(psspy.busdat(fromBuses[i],'BASE')[1] == 138): 
        frequency = lengths[i]*fmt138kV+ft138kV 
        duration = (fmt138kV*dmt138kV*lengths[i]+ft138kV*dt138kV)/frequency 
        failureTime = (frequency*duration)/9528/10 
    elif(psspy.busdat(fromBuses[i],'BASE')[1] == 230): 
        frequency = lengths[i]*fmt230kV+ft230kV 
        duration = (fmt230kV*dmt230kV*lengths[i]+ft230kV*dt230kV)/frequency 
        failureTime = (frequency*duration)/9528/10 
    elif(psspy.busdat(fromBuses[i],'BASE')[1] == 500): 
        frequency = lengths[i]*fmt500kV+ft500kV 
        duration = (fmt500kV*dmt500kV*lengths[i]+ft500kV*dt500kV)/frequency 
        failureTime = (frequency*duration)/9528/10 
    frequencies.append(frequency) 
    durations.append(duration)       
    failureTimes.append(failureTime) 
 
HourlyStatus = [] 
 
f = open("lineOutages.py", "w") 
outageStart = 0 
status = 1 
for j in range(len(fromBuses)): 
    for i in range(len(datetime)): 
        randomNumber = random.uniform(0,1) 
        if(randomNumber <= failureTimes[j]): 
            status = 0 
            outageStart = 1 
        elif((i+j) >= 1 and HourlyStatus[i-1+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-1+(j*len(datetime))][0] 
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]): 
            status = 0 
            outageStart = 0 
        elif((i+j) >= 2 and HourlyStatus[i-2+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-2+(j*len(datetime))][0] 
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]): 
            status = 0 
            outageStart = 0 
        elif((i+j) >= 3 and HourlyStatus[i-3+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-3+(j*len(datetime))][0] 
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]): 
            status = 0 
            outageStart = 0 
        elif((i+j) >= 4 and HourlyStatus[i-4+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-4+(j*len(datetime))][0] 
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]): 
            status = 0 
            outageStart = 0 
        elif((i+j) >= 5 and HourlyStatus[i-5+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-5+(j*len(datetime))][0] 
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]): 
            status = 0 
            outageStart = 0 
        elif((i+j) >= 6 and HourlyStatus[i-6+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-6+(j*len(datetime))][0] 
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]): 
            status = 0 
            outageStart = 0 





            status = 0 
            outageStart = 0 
        elif((i+j) >= 8 and HourlyStatus[i-8+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-8+(j*len(datetime))][0] 
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]): 
            status = 0 
            outageStart = 0 
        elif((i+j) >= 9 and HourlyStatus[i-9+(j*len(datetime))][3] == 1 and HourlyStatus[i-9+(j*len(datetime))][0] 
== [fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]]): 
            status = 0 
            outageStart = 0 
        else: 
            status = 1 
            outageStart = 0 
        hour = i+1 
        HourlyStatus.append([[fromBuses[j],toBuses[j],IDs[j]],hour,status,outageStart]) 
f.write(str(HourlyStatus)) 
 
#For each time step, scale loads, set machines and branches in and out of service, perform economic 
dispatch, perform power flow, and create saved case file 
for k in rangelen(datetime)): 
    psspy.case(r"""savnw.sav""") 
    #Scale loads 
    psspy.bsys(0,0,[ 13.8, 500.],1,[1],0,[],0,[],0,[]) 
    psspy.scal_2(0,0,1,[0,0,0,0,0],[0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0]) 
    psspy.scal_2(0,1,2,[_i,1,0,1,0],[ (1+PACWdev[k])*Area1Avg, 1500.0,0.0,-600.0, 300.0,-.0, 100.0]) 
    psspy.bsys(0,0,[ 13.8, 500.],1,[2],0,[],0,[],0,[]) 
    psspy.scal_2(0,0,1,[0,0,0,0,0],[0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0]) 
    psspy.scal_2(0,1,2,[_i,1,0,1,0],[ (1+AESOdev[k])*Area2Avg, 1400.0,0.0,-.0, 650.0,-.0, 1650.0]) 
    psspy.bsys(0,0,[ 13.8, 500.],1,[5],0,[],0,[],0,[]) 
    psspy.scal_2(0,0,1,[0,0,0,0,0],[0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0]) 
    psspy.scal_2(0,1,2,[_i,1,0,1,0],[ (1+TEPdev[k])*Area5Avg, 358.66,0.0,-.0,0.0,-.0, 200.0]) 
 
    #Set machines in and out of services 
    for i in range(len(generatorMaintenanceSchedule)): 
        if(generatorMaintenanceSchedule[i][1] == (k+1)): 
            machine = generatorMaintenanceSchedule[i][0] 
            mStatus = generatorMaintenanceSchedule[i][2] 
            
psspy.machine_chng_2(machine,r"""1""",[mStatus,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
 
         
    #Set branches in and out of service 
    for i in range(len(HourlyStatus)): 
        if(HourlyStatus[i][1] == (k+1)): 
            fromBus = HourlyStatus[i][0][0] 
            toBus = HourlyStatus[i][0][1] 
            ID = HourlyStatus[i][0][2] 
            branchStatus = HourlyStatus[i][2] 
             
            
psspy.branch_chng(fromBus,toBus,ID,[branchStatus,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
 
         
    ##Perform economic dispatch 
    totalLoad = (1+PACWdev[k])*Area1Avg + (1+AESOdev[k])*Area2Avg + (1+TEPdev[k])*Area5Avg 
    psspy.ecdi(0,1,1,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\EXAMPLE PSSE System - 
Changing Power Flow\EXAMPLE\savnw.ecd""",0,[ 0.0,0.0]) 
    psspy.ecdi(0,1,2,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\EXAMPLE PSSE System - 




    psspy.ecdi(0,1,3,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\EXAMPLE PSSE System - 
Changing Power Flow\EXAMPLE\savnw.ecd""",0,[ totalLoad,0.0]) 
    psspy.ecdi(0,1,4,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\EXAMPLE PSSE System - 
Changing Power Flow\EXAMPLE\savnw.ecd""",0,[ 0.0,0.0]) 
    ##perform OPF 
    psspy.nopf(0,1) 
    ## solve power flow without Var limit 
    psspy.fdns([0,0,0,1,1,0,-1,0]) 
    #psspy.save(r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\EXAMPLE PSSE System - 
Changing Power Flow\EXAMPLE\GeneratedCases\savnw_""" + """Hour_""" + str(k+1) + """.sav""") 
     
    ##Solve power flow 
    # psspy.fdns([0,0,0,1,1,0,99,0]) 
    #Check for convergence 
    ival = psspy.solved() 
    if(ival == 0): 
        psspy.save(r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\EXAMPLE PSSE System - 
Changing Power Flow\EXAMPLE\GeneratedCases\savnw_""" + """Hour_""" + str(k+1) + """.sav""") 
    else:  
        psspy.save(r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\EXAMPLE PSSE System - 
Changing Power Flow\EXAMPLE\UnconvergedGeneratedCases\savnw_""" + """Hour_""" + str(k+1) + 
""".sav""") 
 
A.1.2 Python Scripts for 18-Bus System 
A.1.2.1 Steady-State Saved Case Generation 
#This script creates the saved cases for different generator outputs and load values at each time step in the 
Input_24hr_PV_GEN.csv file for the 18-bus systems. 




#Import generation data 
time_GEN = [] 
NORTH_G1 = [] 
WEST_G1 = [] 
SOUTH_G1 = [] 
EAST_G1 = [] 
EAST_PV = [] 
with open('Input_24hr_PV_GEN.csv', 'rb') as csvfile: 
    spamreader = csv.reader(csvfile, delimiter=',', quotechar='|') 
    rowCount = 0 
    for row in spamreader: 
        #Only get data every 5 minutes 
        if(rowCount != 0 and (rowCount == 1 or ((rowCount-1)%75 == 0))): 
            time_GEN.append(float(row[0])) 
            NORTH_G1.append(float(row[1])) 
            WEST_G1.append(float(row[2])) 
            SOUTH_G1.append(float(row[3])) 
            EAST_G1.append(float(row[4])) 
            EAST_PV.append(float(row[5])) 
        rowCount = rowCount + 1 
#Import load data 
time_LOADS = []  
NORTH_02 = []    
NORTH_03 = []    
WEST_02 = [] 




SOUTH_01_1 = [] 
SOUTH_01_2 = [] 
SOUTH_03 = [] 
EAST_01 = [] 
with open('Input_24hr_PV_LOADS.csv', 'rb') as csvfile: 
    spamreader = csv.reader(csvfile, delimiter=',', quotechar='|') 
    rowCount = 0 
    for row in spamreader: 
        #Only get data every 5 minutes 
        if(rowCount != 0 and (rowCount == 1 or ((rowCount-1)%75 == 0))): 
            time_LOADS.append(float(row[0])) 
            NORTH_02.append(float(row[1])) 
            NORTH_03.append(float(row[2])) 
            WEST_02.append(float(row[3])) 
            WEST_03.append(float(row[4])) 
            SOUTH_01_1.append(float(row[5])) 
            SOUTH_01_2.append(float(row[6])) 
            SOUTH_03.append(float(row[7])) 
            EAST_01.append(float(row[8])) 
        rowCount = rowCount + 1 
 
#Based on base case PGen of NORTH_G1 
NORTH_G1_H1_PERCENT = 159.6729/(159.6729 + 141.5969) 
NORTH_G1_H2_PERCENT = 1 - NORTH_G1_H1_PERCENT 
         
for i in range(12*24): 
    #Load base case 
    psspy.case(r"""t3ps_v33_PV_time_00_00_bus111_2mach.sav""") 
    #Set generation 
    psspy.machine_chng_2(101,r"""H1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ 
NORTH_G1[i]*NORTH_G1_H1_PERCENT,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
    NORTH_G1_H2 = NORTH_G1[i] - (NORTH_G1[i]*NORTH_G1_H1_PERCENT) 
    print NORTH_G1[i]*NORTH_G1_H1_PERCENT 
    psspy.machine_chng_2(101,r"""H2""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ 
NORTH_G1_H2,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
    WEST_G1[i] = WEST_G1[i] - 70.0 
    psspy.machine_chng_2(111,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ 
WEST_G1[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
    psspy.machine_chng_2(231,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ 
SOUTH_G1[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
    psspy.machine_chng_2(311,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ 
EAST_G1[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
    psspy.machine_chng_2(312,r"""PV""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ 
EAST_PV[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])    
    #Set loads 
    psspy.load_chng_4(2,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ NORTH_02[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
    psspy.load_chng_4(3,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ NORTH_03[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
    psspy.load_chng_4(12,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ WEST_02[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
    psspy.load_chng_4(13,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ WEST_03[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
    psspy.load_chng_4(21,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ SOUTH_01_1[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
    psspy.load_chng_4(21,r"""2""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ SOUTH_01_2[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
    psspy.load_chng_4(23,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ SOUTH_03[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
    psspy.load_chng_4(31,r"""1""",[_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[ EAST_01[i],_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
    hour = i/12 
    minutes = (i - (hour*12))*5 
    #Solve power flow 
    psspy.fdns([0,0,0,1,1,0,99,0]) 
    #Check for convergence and save to file 




    if(ival == 0): 
        psspy.save(r"""Generated Cases\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_""" + str(minutes) + 
"""_bus111_2mach.sav""") 
    else:  
        psspy.save(r"""UnconvergedGeneratedCases\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_""" + 
str(minutes) + """_bus111_2mach.sav""") 
 
A.1.2.2 Frequency Stability Assessment Dynamic File Generation 
# This script creates individual dynamic files for each time step, based on input from the 
Input_24hr_PV_GEN_7Mach.csv file for the 18-bus system.  
# This file was created using the generator outputs from the previously generated saved cases for each time 
step. 




#Import generation data 
time_GEN = [] 
total_GEN = [] 
with open('Input_24hr_PV_GEN_7Mach.csv', 'rb') as csvfile: 
    spamreader = csv.reader(csvfile, delimiter=',', quotechar='|') 
    rowCount = 0 
    for row in spamreader: 
        #Only get data every 5 minutes 
        if(rowCount != 0): 
            time_GEN.append(float(row[0])) 
            total_GEN.append(float(row[9])) 
        rowCount = rowCount + 1 
         
max_GEN = max(total_GEN) 
min_GEN = min(total_GEN) 
 
Sid=-1   # All machines 
Flag=1   # Only in-service machines at in-service plants 
ierr, Nmach = psspy.amachcount(Sid, Flag)         # get no of machines in the subsystem 
ierr, iMbus = psspy.amachint(Sid, Flag, 'NUMBER') # get machine bus numbers 










psspy.dyre_new([1,1,1,1],r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from 
NREL\t3ps_PV_bus312_db1_bus111_2mach.dyr""","","","") 
#Get base inertia and machine parameters 
for iM in range(0,(Nmach-1)):  # iterate through the list of machines except for PV machine 
    ibus = iMbus[iM] 
    genId = cMids[iM] 
    ierr,busN = psspy.notona(ibus) # return the bus 18-character extended bus name for a specified bus 
number 
    iH = 0  # resetting the intertia value index 
    iD = 0  # resetting the speed damping value index 
    ierr, icon0 = psspy.mdlind(ibus, genId, 'GEN', 'CON') # get initial CON address (index) 
    ierr, genMdl = psspy.mdlnam(ibus, genId, 'GEN') # get generator model name 




    genMdl = genMdl.strip()                           # remove blanks 
    #   Find absolute index iH in CONS array using relative CON index in the generator model and 
    #   previously found starting CON index of the generator model 
    #  (here shown only for the three most common models) 
    if genMdl=='GENCLS': iH=icon0 
    if (genMdl=='GENSAL')|(genMdl=='GENSAE'): iH=icon0+3     
    if (genMdl=='GENROU')|(genMdl=='GENROE'): iH=icon0+4 
    #   Find absolute index iD in CONS array using relative CON index in the generator model and 
    #   previously found starting CON index of the generator model 
    #  (here shown only for the three most common models) 
    if genMdl=='GENCLS': iD=icon0+1                            
    if (genMdl=='GENSAL')|(genMdl=='GENSAE'): iD=icon0+4     
    if (genMdl=='GENROU')|(genMdl=='GENROE'): iD=icon0+5 
    #   Get value from CONS array corresponding to the generator inertia 
    H.append(psspy.dsrval('CON', iH)[1]) 
    D.append(psspy.dsrval('CON', iD)[1]) 
    #   Get MBASE value 
    MBASE.append(psspy.macdat(ibus, genId, 'MBASE')[1]) 
    P.append(psspy.macdat(ibus, genId, 'P')[1]) 
    Q.append(psspy.macdat(ibus, genId, 'Q')[1]) 
 
#Change intertia of each machine based on total generation at each time step 
slope = (1-0.2)/(max_GEN-min_GEN) 
intercept = 1-(max_GEN*slope) 
inertiaScaleFactor = 1 
inertias = [] 
for i in range(12*24): 
    #Load base dynamic case each time so all inertia levels are set to base value 
    psspy.dyre_new([1,1,1,1],r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from 
NREL\t3ps_PV_bus312_db1_bus111_2mach.dyr""","","","") 
    # Linear equation was derived by using (0.2, min total gen over 24-hour period) and (1, max total gen over 
24-hour period) 
    # Throughout the 24-hour period inertia is scaled between 0.2-1 times the base inertia value 
    inertiaScaleFactor = slope*total_GEN[i]+intercept 
    for iM in range(0,(Nmach-1)):  
        print "------------------------------" 
        print H[iM] 
        # flag = 1 
        ibus = iMbus[iM] 
        genId = cMids[iM] 
        ierr,busN = psspy.notona(ibus) # return the bus 18-character extended bus name for a specified bus 
number 
        iH = 0  # resetting the intertia value index 
        iD = 0  # resetting the speed damping value index 
        ierr, icon0 = psspy.mdlind(ibus, genId, 'GEN', 'CON') # get initial CON address (index) 
        ierr, genMdl = psspy.mdlnam(ibus, genId, 'GEN') # get generator model name 
        print genMdl 
        genMdl = genMdl.strip()                           # remove blanks 
        #   Find absolute index iH in CONS array using relative CON index in the generator model and 
        #   previously found starting CON index of the generator model 
        #  (here shown only for the three most common models) 
        if genMdl=='GENCLS': iH=icon0 
        if (genMdl=='GENSAL')|(genMdl=='GENSAE'): iH=icon0+3     
        if (genMdl=='GENROU')|(genMdl=='GENROE'): iH=icon0+4 
        #   Find absolute index iD in CONS array using relative CON index in the generator model and 
        #   previously found starting CON index of the generator model 
        #  (here shown only for the three most common models) 
        if genMdl=='GENCLS': iD=icon0+1                            




        if (genMdl=='GENROU')|(genMdl=='GENROE'): iD=icon0+5 
        #   Check the generator output 
        if ((P[iM]<999999999)&(P[iM]>-999999999))&((Q[iM]<999999999)&(Q[iM]>-999999999)): 
            print '***A zero output generator is found.***' 
            print(ibus) 
            print(genId)  
            if genMdl=='GENCLS': 
                ibus 
                genId 
                ierr = psspy.change_con(iH, H[iM]*inertiaScaleFactor) 
                print(ibus) 
                print(genId) 
                print(iH) 
                print(H[iM]/10) 
                print '***           End             ***' 
            if (genMdl=='GENSAL')|(genMdl=='GENSAE'): 
                ibus 
                genId 
                ierr = psspy.change_con(iH, H[iM]*inertiaScaleFactor) 
                print(ibus) 
                print(genId) 
                print(iH) 
                print(H[iM]/10) 
                print '***           End             ***' 
            if (genMdl=='GENROU')|(genMdl=='GENROE'): 
                ibus 
                genId 
                ierr = psspy.change_con(iH, H[iM]*inertiaScaleFactor) 
                print(ibus) 
                print(genId) 
                print(iH) 
                print(H[iM]/10) 
                print '***           End             ***' 
    hour = i/12 
    minutes = (i - (hour*12))*5 
    psspy.dyda(0,1,[2,1,1],0,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from 
NREL\Frequency Stability\Dynamic Cases\t3ps_PV_bus312_db1_hour_""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_""" + 
str(minutes) + """_bus111_2mach.dyr""") 
    inertias.append(inertiaScaleFactor) 
print inertias 
 
A.1.2.3 Frequency Stability Assessment Generation Trip Batch Simulations 
# This script takes each converted saved case file and dynamic file (with scaled inertia) at each time period.  
# A generation trip is performed at each time step, with the same amount of generation (70 MW) tripped 
each time. 
 
#Load base cases 
ierr = psspy.case("""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from 
NREL\t3ps_v33_PV_time_00_00_bus111_2mach.sav""") 
psspy.dyre_new([1,1,1,1],r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from 
NREL\t3ps_PV_bus312_db1_bus111_2mach.dyr""","","","") 
     
 
# Generator Bus Number - MachBus 
ierr, MachBus = psspy.amachint(-1, 1, 'NUMBER') 
# Generator ID - MachID 






psspy.bsys(0,0,[ 0.12, 999.],0,[],len(MachBus[0]),MachBus[0],0,[],0,[]) 
 




#Convert loads and generators in saved cases     
for i in range(12*24): 
    hour = i/12 
    minutes = (i - (hour*12))*5 
    #Load saved case for each time 
    ierr = psspy.case(r"""t3ps_v33_PV_hour_"""+str(hour+1)+"""_min_""" 
+str(minutes)+"""_bus111_2mach.sav""") 
    psspy.cong(0) 
    psspy.conl(0,1,1,[0,0],[0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0]) 
    psspy.conl(0,1,2,[0,0],[0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0]) 
    psspy.conl(0,1,3,[0,0],[0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0]) 
    psspy.save(r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from 
NREL\Converted Saved Case 
Files\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_"""+str(hour+1)+"""_min_"""+str(minutes)+"""_bus111_2mach_conv.sav""") 
 
#Trip generation for each case at each time step 
for i in range(12*24): 
    hour = i/12 
    minutes = (i - (hour*12))*5 
    #Load converted file 
    ierr = psspy.case(r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from 
NREL\Converted Saved Case 
Files\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_"""+str(hour+1)+"""_min_"""+str(minutes)+"""_bus111_2mach_conv.sav""") 
    #Load dynamic file 
    psspy.dyre_new([1,1,1,1],r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from 
NREL\Frequency Stability\Dynamic Cases\t3ps_PV_bus312_db1_hour_""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_""" + 
str(minutes) + """_bus111_2mach.dyr""","","","") 
    if((hour+1) < 10): 
        if(minutes < 10): 
            psspy.strt(1,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from 
NREL\Frequency Stability\Output Files\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_0""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_0""" + str(minutes) 
+"""_bus111_2mach_Trip70MW.out""") 
        else: 
            psspy.strt(1,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from 
NREL\Frequency Stability\Output Files\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_0""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_""" + str(minutes) 
+"""_bus111_2mach_Trip70MW.out""") 
    else: 
        if(minutes < 10): 
            psspy.strt(1,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from 
NREL\Frequency Stability\Output Files\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_0""" + str(minutes) 
+"""_bus111_2mach_Trip70MW.out""") 
        else: 
            psspy.strt(1,r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from 
NREL\Frequency Stability\Output Files\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_""" + str(minutes) 
+"""_bus111_2mach_Trip70MW.out""") 
    psspy.run(0,1,0,1,1) 
    #Trip 70 MW of generation 
    psspy.dist_machine_trip(111,'2') 






A.1.2.4 Transient Stability Assessment 3-Phase Fault Batch Simulations 
# This script loads each converted saved case file at each time period and the base dynamic file.  
# A 3-phase fault is performed on the same branch at each time step. Clearing times are adjusted, and 
results are saved to individual files. 
 
#Load base cases 
ierr = psspy.case("""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from 
NREL\Transient Stability\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_1_min_0_bus111_2mach.sav""") 
psspy.dyre_new([1,1,1,1],r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from 
NREL\Transient Stability\t3ps_PV_bus312_db1_bus111_2mach.dyr""","","","") 
     
 
# Generator Bus Number - MachBus 
ierr, MachBus = psspy.amachint(-1, 1, 'NUMBER') 
# Generator ID - MachID 
ierr2, MachID = psspy.amachchar(-1, 1, 'ID') 
 
psspy.dynamics_solution_param_2([50,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f, 0.004,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
psspy.bsys(0,0,[ 0.12, 999.],0,[],len(MachBus[0]),MachBus[0],0,[],0,[]) 
 








for i in range(12*24): 
    hour = i/12 
    minutes = (i - (hour*12))*5 
    #Load converted file 
    ierr = psspy.case(r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from 
NREL\Transient 
Stability\t3ps_v33_PV_hour_"""+str(hour+1)+"""_min_"""+str(minutes)+"""_bus111_2mach_conv.sav""") 
    #Load dynamic file 
    psspy.dyre_new([1,1,1,1],r"""C:\Users\sfabus\Documents\Machine Learing Project\18 Bus System from 
NREL\Transient Stability\t3ps_PV_bus312_db1_bus111_2mach.dyr""","","","") 
    for j in range(len(clearingTimes)): 
        clearingTimeName = str(clearingTimes[j]) 
        if(clearingTimes[j] == 0.5 or clearingTimes[j] == 0.6 or clearingTimes[j] == 0.7): 
            clearingTimeName = clearingTimeName + '00' 
        else: 
            clearingTimeName = clearingTimeName + '0' 
        if((hour+1) < 10): 
            if(minutes < 10): 
                psspy.strt(1,r"""t3ps_v33_PV_hour_0""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_0""" + str(minutes) 
+"""_bus111_2mach_Fault_CT_0_""" +clearingTimeName[2:5]+""".out""") 
            else: 
                psspy.strt(1,r"""t3ps_v33_PV_hour_0""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_""" + str(minutes) 
+"""_bus111_2mach_Fault_CT_0_""" +clearingTimeName[2:5]+""".out""") 
        else: 
            if(minutes < 10): 
                psspy.strt(1,r"""t3ps_v33_PV_hour_""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_0""" + str(minutes) 
+"""_bus111_2mach_Fault_CT_0_""" +clearingTimeName[2:5]+""".out""") 
            else: 
                psspy.strt(1,r"""t3ps_v33_PV_hour_""" + str(hour+1) + """_min_""" + str(minutes) 
+"""_bus111_2mach_Fault_CT_0_""" +clearingTimeName[2:5]+""".out""") 




        #Apply 3-phase fault 
        psspy.dist_branch_fault(21,32,'1',1,0.0,[0.0,-2.0E11]) # apply fault 
        psspy.run(1,1+clearingTimes[j],0,1,1) 
        psspy.dist_clear_fault(1) # clear fault after specified clearing time 
        psspy.run(0, 20.0,0,1,1) 
     
 
A.2 Power Plant and Machine Modeling Consideration for 
PREPA Transmission Model 
In the developed base case model, each generation plant was modeled as a 
separate machine with its rated real power output set as each plant’s capacity. 
For example, the Aguirre Power Complex has a gas turbine plant, steam turbine 
plant, and a combined cycle plant. The three plants were modeled as three 
individual machines connected to one bus. The same process was followed for 
the Costa Sur steam and turbine plants and the San Juan steam and combined 
cycle plants, with two machines at each location connected to a single bus. Palo 
Seco also has two machines at a single bus, one steam and the other 
combustion-turbine. All other plants were modeled as a single machine 
connected to a single bus. (If necessary for specific studies, further modifications 
could be made to show individual units at each plant and their capacities.) 
 
A.3 Development of High PV Models of PREPA System 
Using 2019 Day-Peak Model 
The PREPA 2019 day-peak model, provided by DOE, contains 1,237 buses, 
including transmission and distribution levels. In this model, there are 133 total 
machines, with 62 of the machines online.  
 
The purpose of the study was to analyze system dynamic frequency response, 
after a set contingency, when non-renewable machines in the system are 
replaced with solar. First, generator models for each machine specified in the 
dynamics (.dyr) file, were used to determine whether or not a machine was 
renewable or non-renewable. During this study, the real power output of online 
machines was used to calculate the percentage of renewable machine output to 
total generation output. The total real power output of all online machines is 
approximately 2,698.43 MW, and the total capacity of online machines is 
13,973.46 MW. In the base case, the percentage of renewable machine output to 
total online generation was calculated to be approximately 15%, with the real 
power output of renewable machines totaling 408.19 MW. At each penetration 
level studied including the base case, a machine at San Juan Steam Plant, 
outputting 80 MW, was tripped. In each scenario, the speed deviation of all 
machines in the system was monitored and converted to frequency. The 














Simulations of this contingency were also performed at the 30%, 50%, 70%, 
80%, and 90% renewable penetration levels. Table A.1 contains the online non-
renewable machines, including their bus number, bus name, ID, and real power 
output. To obtain certain levels of renewable penetration, combinations of 
machines listed in Table A.1 were replaced with solar machines. To do this, the 
machine’s generator model, governor model, and exciter models were deleted in 
the dynamic file. The generator model was then replaced with the GEPVG 
model, and the exciter model was replaced with the GEPVE model. The 
parameters for the GEPVG model are included in Table 3.9. The PRATE 
parameter, or rated power the generator, varied depending on the capacity of the 
individual machine. Typical parameters for the GEPVE model are included in 
Table 3.10. 
 
The renewable penetration levels studied include 30%, 50%, 70%, 80%, and 
90% of online renewable machine output to system total generation output. After 
the dynamic models of the substituted machines were modified for each 
penetration case, dynamic simulations were performed. For each penetration 
level, the system frequency response while tripping 80 MW of generation is 
plotted (Figure A.2- Figure A.8). As solar penetration increases, the frequency 
nadir, or minimum post-contingency frequency, decreases, and it takes the 
system frequency a longer time to settle. 
 
Once the renewable penetration level reached 80%, the UFLT relays in the 
system began to actuate. Further explanation about the UFLT relay settings and 
operation is provided in Section 3.1.4. With line relays included in the model for 
the 80% renewable case, the frequency sharply increases after reaching 
approximately 58.5 Hz, rises to about 60.3 Hz, and then begins to decrease and 
settle. The rise in frequency above 60 Hz is due to several load buses islanded, 
as a result of under-frequency line trips, without any in-service machines. Without 
line relays in the model, the frequency response is smoother and more closely 
follows the shape of the 70% case but with lower frequency nadir. 
 
Line relays also trip in the 90% renewable case. Comparing Figure A.7 to Figure 
A.5, the frequency initially dropped at a faster rate than the 80% case. Frequency 
also increased at a faster rate after reaching a frequency nadir of about 58.5 Hz. 
 
When removing line relays, the frequency of the 90% case continued to drop. 
This is because several machines dropped off of the system due to their under-






Table A.1. Online non-renewable machines 
Bus  Number Bus  Name ID PGen (MW) 
805 C.S.5       23.000 1 250 
806 C.S.6       23.000 1 250 
809 AG.1        24.000 1 230.5284 
810 AG.2        23.000 1 230 
819 P.SECO3     20.000 1 170 
820 P.SECO4     20.000 1 170 
871 AES 1       21.000 1 166 
872 AES 2       21.000 1 166 
856 SJREPG1     13.800 1 139.5 
860 ECOSTEAM    17.100 1 98 
858 ECOGT1      17.100 1 88 
859 ECOGT2      17.100 1 88 
813 SANJUAN7    13.800 1 80 
814 SANJUAN8    13.800 1 80 












































A.4 How to Use the PGST Tool 
This section describes how to use Dr. Pan’s PGST tool for mapping PSS®E-
developed models. This tool involves using PSSE_Data_Interface software to 
import PSS®E system data and export this data into text files the PSGT can 
read.  
 
1. Open the PSSE_Data_Interface software. A screenshot of the software 
interface can be seen in Figure A.9. 
2. Select the “Open raw” button, and locate your PSS®E raw file. After 
the file has been opened, hit “Export.” These options are indicated in 
Figure A.10. Several text files will be generated:  area, branch, bus, 
load transformer, and zone. 
3. Open the PGST software. Click “File” -> “New” to create a new 
PSSE_Interface file. Select “Bus” -> “Load” and then the “bus.txt” 
document generated by the PSSE_Data_Interface software. Buses 
should be clustered in a configuration similar to Figure A.11. 
4. Import branch data by selecting “Branch” -> “Load” and then the 
“branch.txt” file generated by the PSSE_Data_Interface software. 
Branches can now be seen connecting the buses in the 
PSSE_Interface file, such as the system seen in Figure A.12. 
5. To load GPS data, create two text files: “bus_location.txt” and 
“bus_sub.txt.” The “bus_sub.txt” file should contain all of the buses in 
the system pasted into a column twice with no header. The 
“bus_location.txt” file should contain the GPS coordinates, one column 
for latitude and another for longitude, with coordinates given in decimal 
degrees. There should be no headers in the file, and the order of the 
coordinate pairs should follow the order of the buses as they are listed 
in the “bus_sub.txt” file. 
6. In PSGT, click “Bus” -> “Load Sub-Bus GPS” to import the 
“bus_location.txt” and “bus_sub.txt” files. Once GPS data has been 
added, buses should be spread out according to their location data. 
The previous example with GPS coordinates included is shown in 
Figure A.13. 
7. The map can also be color-coded based on voltage level, area, and 
zone. This can be done by going to “View” -> “Color Mode” and then 
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